Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns
Patrick B. Johnston, April 2012
Summary
Targeting of militant leaders is central to many states’ national security strategies, but does it work? What should policymakers expect when armed forces capture or kill militant leaders? Is leadership decapitation more likely to succeed or fail under certain conditions? These questions have never been more pressing than after the May 2011 killing of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. As relevant as these questions are to current U.S. policy and strategy, they are also fundamental questions of asymmetric warfare.
Keywords
Counter-insurgency Terrorism Security
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