

SEPTEMBER 2023

NATIONAL-LOCAL COOPERATION (NLC) TOOLKIT

GCTF INITIATIVE ON THE PRACTICAL USE OF
THE GCTF MEMORANDUM ON GOOD
PRACTICES ON NATIONAL-LOCAL
COOPERATION IN PREVENTING
AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM



GCTF

GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM



A Roadmap for Operationalizing a “Whole of Society” Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations	3
About this Toolkit	4
GCTF’s <i>Good Practices on Strengthening National-Local Cooperation in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism</i>	6
Introduction	9
Chapter 1: Trust	11
Chapter 2: Inclusivity	20
Chapter 3: Coordination	26
Chapter 4: Communication	31
Chapter 5: Capacity	37
Chapter 6: Sustainability	45
NLC Implementation Checklist	51
Glossary of Terms	53
Annex I: Resources	54
Annex II: Case Studies Index	58



Abbreviations

AU	African Union
CAP	Community Action Plan
CAT	Community Action Team
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EU	European Union
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighter
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
IJJ	International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LAP	Local Action Plan
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
NAP	National Action Plan
NLC	National-Local Cooperation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P/CVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism
R&R	Rehabilitation and Reintegration
TOC	Theory of Change
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOCT	United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime



About this Toolkit

This toolkit was developed to support the operationalization of the Global Counterterrorism Forum's (GCTF) 2020 [*Memorandum on Good Practices on Strengthening National-Local Cooperation in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism*](#) (further referred to as the Memorandum). It is designed to provide policy makers and practitioners with practical guidance and examples of good practice for enhancing national-local cooperation (NLC) for preventing and countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism (P/CVE). [Editor's Note: To help enhance its user-friendliness, the toolkit uses "P/CVE" to mean "preventing and countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism".]

The Memorandum was developed in recognition that sustainable and effective efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism require a "whole of society"¹ approach that incorporates the coordinated and collaborative efforts of different stakeholders at local and national levels. While this approach is becoming increasingly applied globally, many countries are facing gaps in the systems, structures, and processes needed to realize and strengthen cooperation between and among actors – government and non-government alike – who contribute to P/CVE at different levels.

With this challenge in mind, Australia and Indonesia, the Co-Chairs of the GCTF's [*Countering Violent Extremism \(CVE\) Working Group*](#), launched the *Initiative on National-Local Cooperation in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism* in September 2019, facilitated by the [*Strong Cities Network*](#) (Strong Cities) and the Prevention Project. The process brought together national and local government officials, front-line practitioners, representatives from civil society, think tanks, universities and the private sector, as well as international, regional, and sub-regional organizations in a series of in-person and virtual workshops, consultations and online questionnaires. These discussions informed the Memorandum, which was launched in September 2020.

The Memorandum enumerates 13 good practices that, if applied, can support countries in strengthening the cooperation between local and national P/CVE actors in a manner that is non-discriminatory, consistent with international law, and reflective of the diversity of threats and challenges present at the national and local levels. To provide guidance and support the practical application of the Memorandum, CVE Working Group Co-Chairs, Australia and Indonesia, proposed the development of a toolkit for policymakers and practitioners. Launched in September 2023, Kelsey Bjornsgaard, Eric Rosand and Joe Downy from the Strong Cities Management Unit developed this toolkit with inputs from across Strong Cities' network of some 200 member cities.

This toolkit is designed to provide policy makers and practitioners working at the national and local levels with additional practical guidance to support application of the 13 good practices described in the Memorandum. The toolkit details six pillars that underlie effective NLC and presents good practice and recommendations rooted in real-world examples, drawing from more than 60 case studies² from around the world. It also includes an 'NLC Implementation Checklist' and a compendium of resources and publications to further aid implementation.

¹ The toolkit recognizes that there may be instances where the views of certain segments of society are incompatible with a "whole of society" approach to P/CVE and thus groups with these views cannot be included in such an approach.

² The case studies provided are intended as inspiration and are not necessarily endorsed by the GCTF, its members, the GCTF Administrative Unit, or the authors of this toolkit.



The case studies included in the toolkit are illustrative, not exhaustive. The authors have selected from a wealth of examples to present a collection that is geographically and contextually diverse to showcase different approaches to support P/CVE actors globally as they pursue effective NLC. It also includes case studies at different points of development and delivery, some of which may no longer be active, but that still hold valuable lessons for NLC. The examples featured include some strategies and programs that have yet to be fully implemented, or properly evaluated. As such, rather than being identified as “best practices” for the reader, they are offered as inspiration to national and local actors interested in improving P/CVE-related NLC in their country.

This toolkit is the product of a comprehensive consultation process involving hundreds of individuals, including national and local policy makers, civil society representatives, academics, multilateral and international organizations, as well as experts and practitioners in a range of practices related to P/CVE. It was supplemented through an extensive desktop survey of research and good practices in NLC for P/CVE that included relevant national and local strategies, action plans, legislation, academic publications, program reports, and toolkits. It is intended to support a “whole of society”, multidisciplinary approach to P/CVE that respects the “Do No Harm” principle, through which appropriate safeguards are included to minimize risk for everyone involved and mitigate, as best as possible, any unintended consequences.



13 GOOD PRACTICES

GCTF's Good Practices on Strengthening National-Local Cooperation in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism

1 Identify the barriers or other challenges to National-Local Cooperation.

These can include societal, policy, coordination, coherence, and capacity challenges. Mapping and consultation, including with and/or by local actors, are important to deepen and broaden an understanding of P/CVE-related NLC barriers across sectors, levels and positions.

2 Identify, delineate, and respect the comparative advantages of the different levels of P/CVE conducive to terrorism actors.

Understanding the comparative advantages of the different levels and types of actors supports effective “whole of society” approaches to P/CVE by defining the complementary roles and differentiated responsibilities of each. Policy and program development processes that engage with each actor, not only on an individual basis, but in a collaborative fashion that coordinates and reinforces their efforts can contribute to effective and sustainable NLC.

3 Lead an inclusive, consultative, multi-layered, national dialogue on P/CVE conducive to terrorism.

An inclusive and participatory dialogue should involve a wide range of stakeholders to establish a mutual understanding and ensure that national and local policy frameworks and action plans reflect the needs and priorities of intended beneficiary communities and build on rather than undermine or compete with existing local programs.

4 Develop and promote an inclusive national P/CVE conducive to terrorism framework that reflects the perspectives of a diversity of national and local government and non-government actors.

The dialogues described in Good Practice Three should lead to a national framework that reflects the needs of all stakeholders. In addition to being inclusive, national frameworks should (i) be flexible and adaptable to local contexts; (ii) be informed by international good practice; (iii) be based on a shared vision of all stakeholders; (iv) identify local drivers, vulnerabilities, and protective factors to VE; (v) be coordinated by a lead agency; (vi) use a shared vocabulary understood by the government and the public; and (vii) be linked to a coordination and governance mechanism to promote accountability.

5 Invest in local actors, frameworks, and programs.

National governments should provide support to local government and non-governmental actors to enable them to support and implement national P/CVE frameworks. This will contribute to building trust and cooperation with local authorities and civil society while promoting a multidisciplinary approach that reflects national and local priorities and needs, leverages local services, institutions, and professionals, and is gender and youth sensitive.

6 Build and strengthen trust.

P/CVE stakeholders should prioritize building and strengthening trust and dialogue between and among different actors at the national and local level, including the government and non-governmental sectors. This includes between local communities and law enforcement, and among law enforcement, the government, the private sector, and social service practitioners, while recognizing



the challenges in doing so with certain communities and community organizations, particularly ones that may hold views that are incompatible with a 'whole-of society' approach.

7 Facilitate appropriate information sharing between P/CVE conducive to terrorism actors while protecting privacy.

Clear guidelines or other frameworks and principles that outline how, when and what to share and with whom should be elaborated. This should include an independent oversight and review process.

8 Enable and promote effective coordination, communication, and collaboration among national and local stakeholders relevant to the design and implementation of a P/CVE conducive to terrorism NAP or other relevant national framework.

Coordination platforms and mechanisms that can facilitate horizontal and vertical coordination and include representatives from all levels of government and society should be developed and/or strengthened. Forging multisectoral partnerships can allow for deeper understanding of local dynamics and can facilitate community engagement. Further, this is especially important for breaking down silos to foster partnerships and encourage the sharing of knowledge, resources, research and experience.

9 Balance national leadership and local ownership.

The national government, which has primary responsibility for national security issues, is uniquely placed to coordinate multi-actor efforts; however, national frameworks should create space for local ownership in implementing national strategies. This will help ensure sustained and effective implementation at the local level and in communities.

10 Encourage sustainable funding to support local implementation of national P/CVE conducive to terrorism frameworks.

Local and national governments should provide funding and support mechanisms for local P/CVE actors and/or initiatives. Where possible, governments should leverage existing local resources dedicated to crime or violence prevention or community safety more broadly. Where possible, governments should seek partnerships with private sector companies, international and multilateral organizations and foundations to supplement funding.

11 Provide, or otherwise support, tailored training and other capacity building.

Governments should invest in building the capacities of local P/CVE actors, promote professionalization in the field, help the development of innovative P/CVE initiatives and promote effective delivery against national frameworks and action plans. This can include directly providing, facilitating, or otherwise resourcing training, capacity and network building, guidance for program design and evaluation, tools, and research, as well as 'train-the-trainer' models and scenario-based consultative arrangements, such as table-top exercises.

12 Sustain political support.

Strong political support is critical for national P/CVE efforts. Political goodwill promotes sustained backing for P/CVE related activities, helps increase awareness about national and local strategies and contributes to a shared understanding among key actors. This may necessitate public messaging around national frameworks and strategic visions, partnerships and approaches, regularly updated to account for evolving threats, needs, and priorities.



13 Enable the effective and sustained monitoring and evaluation of national and local P/CVE conducive to terrorism initiatives.

Monitoring and evaluating national and local action plans as well as individual P/CVE activities helps to promote targeted support, bolster long-term investments, improve understanding of what works and ultimately enhances P/CVE strategies that are fit for purpose for national and local contexts. National and, where feasible, local governments, should encourage and enable this work, recognizing that learning from both P/CVE successes and failures helps refine strategies and approaches and identify areas that require improvement. This may include providing training and developing and disseminating guidance to enable local actors to consistently evaluate initiatives. Learning from both successes and failures helps refine strategies and identify areas that require improvement.



Introduction

Violent extremism conducive to terrorism (violent extremism) is a phenomenon requiring a “whole of society” and cross-institutional approach that capitalizes on the skills and other capacities of different actors at every level, allowing for a coherent and coordinated effort. National governments are well placed to plan, coordinate, and resource responses to violent extremism and terrorism, but they will often prioritize law enforcement or other security interventions and devote less attention to the nuanced needs and vulnerabilities of communities and, more broadly, the conditions conducive to violent extremism. This approach can undermine trust with local communities, particularly those where perceptions of marginalization are most acute. It can also hinder efforts to leverage the unique resources, expertise, and connections that local actors wield.

On the other hand, local actors typically have a comparative advantage in designing and implementing targeted P/CVE initiatives due to their clearer understanding of local needs and priorities and better access to and credibility within local communities. However, they often lack the capacity, resources, and awareness, particularly of the wider P/CVE ecosystem in their country, needed to fully leverage these advantages.

It is only when the comparative advantages of both national and local actors are tapped into, properly calibrated, combined, and effectively coordinated that “whole of society” approaches to P/CVE – recognized as international good practice by the United Nations and the GCTF – can take root in an effective and sustainable manner. This underscores the need for national and local leaders and practitioners around the globe to include NLC as a cross-cutting, strategic pillar of national and local P/CVE efforts.

“National-local cooperation includes cooperation among relevant actors within a particular country. These can vary depending on the country and can include national government, local government, law enforcement professionals, mental health and education practitioners and other relevant civil society organizations, the private sector, and researchers.” GCTF Memorandum

As a practice, NLC encompasses the structures, resources, and approaches that cohere national strategies with localized needs and enable actors at both levels to work collectively and maximize the impact of their P/CVE efforts. Thus, NLC is a pathway to a “whole of society” approach to P/CVE, while recognizing that there may be instances where the views held by certain segments of a society, whether on an individual or group basis are incompatible with such an approach. To help navigate this pathway, this toolkit breaks down NLC into six pillars: trust, inclusivity, coordination, communication, capacity, and sustainability. It also provides practical guidance, recommendations, and illustrative case studies and other resources to support national and local actors in pursuit of NLC for P/CVE objectives.

Although P/CVE is the primary focus for this toolkit, readers are reminded that effective NLC has benefits that extend well beyond P/CVE, with relevance to a wide range of other sectors and agendas,



including public health, climate change, education, human rights, gender-inclusivity³ and migration. It can promote a healthy civil society, empower local communities, encourage and secure local actors' ownership of and involvement in efforts to prevent and counter threats and challenges that extend well-beyond violent extremism, and ensure that relevant national policies and programs are informed by community needs and priorities and have the support from local stakeholders. Realizing this potential can help build the social cohesion and resilience communities need to reduce susceptibility to radicalization to violence and deter recruitment efforts of violent extremist or terrorist groups.

³ In 2018, the UN Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity submitted a report not only recognizing that concepts of gender identity vary greatly across the world, but also acknowledging that "the manner in which laws and policies define identity terms has a significant impact on whether and to what extent universally protected human rights are recognized and protected under the law." UN General Assembly, "Protection Against Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity: Note by the Secretariat," A/73/152, 12 July 2018, para. 4. One of the outcomes of that report was a report on gender identity. See UN Independent Expert on Protection Against Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, "Report on Gender Identity," n.d., https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SexualOrientation/GenderIdentityReport_SOGI.pdf.



Chapter 1: Trust

Trust is the cornerstone of cooperation and fundamental to all P/CVE endeavors, including NLC. A lack of trust was also the most frequently cited barrier to NLC in the consultations and research undertaken to build out this toolkit. There are many forms of trust that, when developed and maintained, can enhance NLC for P/CVE. Conversely, when this trust is missing, it can severely limit P/CVE efforts at all levels. Trust should flow in both directions, and when there is limited trust between national and local actors, including with the public, it can inhibit information sharing, collaboration and meaningful participation required for P/CVE to be effective.

When reflecting on how to enhance NLC, national and local actors should consider:

- When national government trusts local stakeholders, they are more likely to include local actors in the development of national P/CVE frameworks, which ultimately increases local ownership and the potential for localized implementation of the frameworks.
- When local government and other stakeholders trust the national government and law enforcement, they are more likely to share information or cooperate in P/CVE interventions.
- When citizens trust the government – especially national government – and law enforcement, they are more likely to engage with P/CVE programs and cooperate with law enforcement. This can strengthen community engagement programs, which are often a critical part of P/CVE and enhance efforts to create early warning mechanisms.
- When members of different communities trust one another, it can reduce inter-communal tensions, which if not mitigated, can lead to violence, and stand in the way of a unified response to violent extremism.

The roles and relationships between P/CVE stakeholders will vary depending on the context, but in every case, trust between these stakeholders is critical. This chapter outlines different approaches for building trust that will enhance P/CVE-related NLC.

KEY CONSIDERATIONS:

- Trust is consistently low in countries where counterterrorism measures have been overly broad in their design and/or application or repressive in nature. This approach, which is often characterized by its highly securitized and centralized nature, has often exacerbated local grievances, some of which are conditions that are conducive to the spread of violent extremism. This has undermined P/CVE efforts, in part by reducing the likelihood that local actors are willing to collaborate or partner with national stakeholders whom they see as a source of their insecurity.
- Common sources of mistrust include citizens' perception of corruption or experience with heavy-handed policing contributing to poor relationships with law enforcement, and limited knowledge or understanding among local officials, community leaders and the public of P/CVE, government-led strategies and the role of each stakeholder in delivering them.
- Local leaders, including government officials and religious and tribal leaders, typically have greater access to, understanding of, and credibility among their communities. This allows local leaders to provide national governments with access to aggrieved groups or those most susceptible to violent extremist propaganda. This also leaves them better placed than their national counterparts to reduce inter-communal tensions, build bridges between law enforcement and vulnerable populations and communities more broadly, and design and implement trust building activities. Building trust is a complex and time-consuming process.



Certain historical, social, or political factors may act as obstacles to trust-building, and recognizing these challenges is essential in developing effective strategies.

RELEVANT GCTF GOOD PRACTICES:

- **Good Practice 2:** Identify, delineate, and respect the comparative advantages of the different levels of P/CVE conducive to terrorism actors.
- **Good Practice 6:** Build and strengthen trust.
- **Good Practice 8:** Enable and promote effective coordination, communication, and collaboration among national and local stakeholders relevant to the design and implementation of a P/CVE conducive to terrorism NAP or other relevant national frameworks.
- **Good Practice 9:** Balance national leadership and local ownership.
- **Good Practice 12:** Sustain political support.

1. National and local governments can help bridge trust deficits by promoting local ownership and empowering local government and community leaders.

Promoting local ownership of P/CVE can help enhance trust among communities who are the intended beneficiaries of P/CVE activities by facilitating engagement with and enhancing support to them. Local governments are typically better placed than national-level officials to build and maintain trust-based relationships with the residents of their cities, towns, and villages. These regular touchpoints with their communities gives local governments an advantage when implementing national-level initiatives and support at the local level.

For NLC to be successful, trust should flow both ways between national and local actors. This begins with a recognition that both levels of government have a role to play in P/CVE efforts and that collaboration – where each has an opportunity to play their own role – is essential.

- National governments can overcome trust deficits, which have often been exacerbated as a result of issues that arose during the COVID-19 crisis, by taking a more “bottom-up” approach to the development of P/CVE policies and decentralizing P/CVE delivery. The objective should be to empower local leaders and create space for P/CVE efforts to be integrated into existing non-security-oriented, community- and local service-based initiatives.
- National governments should, where appropriate, support the development of local action plans (LAPs) that advance P/CVE objectives and are aligned with national frameworks but tailored to each local context. In doing so, national governments should take into account the concerns, needs, and priorities of local communities.
- Both national and local representatives should prioritize building trust and community engagement, especially with historically marginalized or other groups susceptible to violent extremist recruitment by engaging community leaders and other diverse local actors as part of a collaborative approach. They should define clear roles and responsibilities for these local actors within national and local action plans.
- National and local governments, where feasible, should provide resources, training and other forms of direct support for locally led P/CVE initiatives on a consistent basis.



“Establishing the appropriate balance between national leadership and local ownership of a national P/CVE conducive to terrorism framework is critical to its sustained implementation on the ground.” Good Practice 9

National governments can strengthen local leadership and engagement by mandating or otherwise facilitating the development and/or use of local, community-based structures that directly engage different community members in P/CVE and leverage them as trusted partners and credible voices. These locally led, multi-stakeholder platforms often involve a diversity of representatives from the local community, including religious leaders, educators, social workers, youth workers and law enforcement, as well as representatives of the national government. These community structures are integral in identifying and engaging frontline actors within the community in P/CVE efforts. This can include working with them to inform and empower citizens with the knowledge and tools to detect early signs of radicalization to violence and potential violent extremist threats within the community. They also help to build an appropriate and coordinated response to issues of violent extremism that is both tailored to the local context and in line with national prevention strategies.

In the **Republic of North Macedonia**, these local government-led community-level structures – called [Community Action Teams](#) (CATs) – were mandated by the National CVE Strategy (2018-2022). Similarly in **Kenya**, [Community Teams](#) were developed in three Kenyan counties in collaboration with the National Counter Terrorism Centre.

In **Serbia**, the national government mandated municipalities to establish [Local Safety Councils](#) in 2002. However, they had largely lain [dormant](#) until two mass shootings in May 2023 spurred them to mandate municipalities to revitalize these structures once more. These examples show the important role that the national government can play in engendering local P/CVE structures, in some cases by integrating P/CVE into existing community platforms.

In these examples, the community-level structures were initiated by the national government and then developed in collaboration with local government. In **Jordan** and **Lebanon**, by contrast, this process began at the local level when six municipalities worked with the Strong Cities Network, with support from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to establish [Local Prevention Networks](#), which were then endorsed by both countries’ national governments. Many of these efforts were [inspired](#) by city- and other locally led multi-stakeholder responses to violence, crime and safeguarding, including ‘situation tables’ in Canada, ‘info-houses’ in Denmark, ‘safety houses’ in The Netherlands, ‘partner tables’ in Belgium, the ‘Anchor program’ in Finland and Channel ‘panels’ in the United Kingdom.

Local P/CVE structures (or structures that can be leveraged for P/CVE purposes) have proximity to a city’s residents and members of the networks or other local structures are immersed in the day-to-day experiences and challenges of their community. They have a nuanced understanding of the factors that can fuel violent extremism and their position helps ensure that P/CVE approaches are tailored to local needs and include credible touchpoints for community engagement to build understanding, trust and buy-in for national and local P/CVE initiatives. In addition to building trust, community-based P/CVE structures can be **inclusive** and participatory and provide critical mechanisms for **coordination** and **communication**.



“Local governments should engage with, build trust, and enhance coordination among all levels of actors to develop a shared understanding of their interest and contribution to P/CVE conducive to terrorism, as well as a shared understanding of the terrorist threat and locally led approaches for addressing it, while respecting the mandate and purpose of each actor.” Good Practice 2

National governments can also harness the P/CVE benefits that local structures can offer, by leveraging existing bodies, rather than creating new ones. In fact, this type of approach can enhance the **sustainability** of local P/CVE approaches as the toolkit will later highlight.

For example, in **Uzbekistan** [‘mahallas’](#) or local citizens’ assemblies provide an important bridge between the national and local level where people can express their grievances, conduct dialogues, and present proposals. There are more than 10,000 mahallas across Uzbekistan that give citizens a say in local governance through crime prevention, educating citizens on the country’s legal system, providing aid to vulnerable members of the community, and promoting healthy lifestyles. With [support](#) from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Uzbek government took advantage of its extensive *mahalla* system to facilitate local implementation of its National Strategy to Counter Extremism and Terrorism. Thus, Mahallas’ remit now includes advancing socially inclusive decision-making, designing and implementing P/CVE interventions, enhancing civic engagement, and the early identification of community grievances.

Another example can be found in **Toronto**, Canada where the [FOCUS](#) (Furthering Our Communities Uniting Services) program harnesses input from 154 community agencies across the city to identify and support vulnerable individuals and families who are at Acutely Elevated Risk. When participating community agencies make a recommendation, FOCUS, led by a cross-sector partnership between the Toronto Police Service, the City of Toronto and the United Way of Greater Toronto, provides a coordinated intervention. Rather than creating a new local platform to address concerns about violent extremism, P/CVE issues were integrated into the systems-focused collaboration of existing mechanisms across the city that already had built up trust among the relevant local organizations and communities. In this way, it leverages existing agencies and their role within communities to support P/CVE efforts. This is also a valuable example of **coordination**.

“National governments should define the complementary roles of the different actors in P/CVE conducive to terrorism, sustain political commitment and provide effective and accountable governance.” Good Practice 2

2. Promote transparency to enhance trust in government-led P/CVE processes.

“National governments should recognize the importance of transparency in planning and implementing relevant national P/CVE conducive to terrorism frameworks and allowing access to M&E and other relevant information regarding national and local P/CVE conducive to terrorism policy and



programming to promote good practices concerning these policies and programs.” Good practice 6

Transparency is a commitment to openness and honesty that allows for accountability. Sharing information about P/CVE strategies and activities, as well as the process that led to their development, enables greater participation from and cooperation with different stakeholders and can garner trust that enhances political support for government-led P/CVE efforts. It can also help counter perceptions of politicization or bias against certain communities and increase understanding of P/CVE strategies among local leaders and the public at large. Local and national governments should consider approaches to make their processes more transparent by sharing information and documentation about the development, implementation and evaluation of strategies and responses, and inviting participation from non-governmental actors. This in turn will allow open communication channels to foster understanding, reduce misunderstandings, and build trust in the decision-making process.

Such transparency is particularly important given lingering (mis)perceptions in some communities regarding the nature and target of P/CVE efforts. This is particularly so in contexts where the national government has labelled public opponents or human rights advocates as “violent extremists”. A commitment to transparency can make it more difficult to justify the misuse of P/CVE measures and can help reassure those who are suspicious of government-led efforts. Where there is a history of misuse, it will take time to rebuild trust, but transparency is an important step in doing so.

A critical way for national governments to enhance support for strategic frameworks and action plans is by ensuring there is transparency surrounding their development, delivery and review. **Finland** provides a useful example. When its [National Action Plan](#) (NAP) for the prevention of violence, radicalization to violence and violent extremism was up for review, the Ministry of the Interior (Moi) commissioned an independent assessment, which was informed by interviews with different national and local, government and non-governmental stakeholders. The assessment identified successes and challenges and included recommendations, which were addressed in the new NAP (2019-2023). The resulting report was published on the Moi’s public website.

Similarly, in 2021, **Switzerland** also performed a review of its [NAP](#) to prevent radicalization to violence by commissioning an external evaluation performed by an independent third party, further enhancing accountability. The results, which were released publicly, not only highlighted the significant contributions that had been made to prevention efforts in the implementation period, but also documented gaps and challenges that would be addressed in the second NAP (2023 – 2027).

Switzerland’s and Finland’s independent (and publicly available) reviews of their NAPs not only exemplify transparency, but also showcase **inclusivity**, as input was gathered from stakeholders in all levels of government, as well as from civil society and other community-level actors. Among other things, this commitment to both transparency and inclusivity can help reassure the public that the country’s P/CVE policies and programs are evidence-based and, for example, are not targeting particular groups based on religious, ethnic, or political grounds.

“National governments should include an independent oversight and accountability component, which could, inter alia help promote accountability of those involved in designing and delivering P/CVE conducive to terrorism policies



and programs, and particularly that such efforts are age and gender sensitive and are consistent with international human rights law.” Good Practice 8

Enhancing Trust and Building Social Cohesion in the Wake of a Terrorist Attack (Case Study Box)

New Zealand

On March 15, 2019 a gunman shared a white-supremacist manifesto before entering two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, where he killed 51 people and injured 40 more. Ten days later, New Zealand’s national government announced that a [Royal Commission of Inquiry](#) would be established to investigate and report on the incident. The December 2020 commission [report](#) provides a transparent and detailed assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the government’s efforts to prevent and respond to the attack and recommends changes to prevent future attacks in New Zealand.

- **Transparency and accountability:** The final report was shared publicly, and the government provided details about the drafting process, including the advisory group’s decisions, recommendations, timelines and progress reports.
- **Inclusivity:** The report was informed by numerous consultations with local communities, including survivors and those affected by the attack, religious leaders, researchers, academics, experts, civil society organizations, and the public.
- **Coordination:** The report established a multi-sectoral advisory group to advise on the implementation of its 44 recommendations.

The commission’s report called for the establishment of annual ‘huis’, or assemblies, hosted by the national government to convene central and local government agencies, communities, civil society, the private sector and researchers. In 2021, the first of these annual huis – called ‘[He Whenua Taurikura](#)’ (a country at peace) – focused on countering terrorism and violent extremism. It included a series of panels and workshops designed to promote public dialogue and understanding of violent extremism and allow for discussions on how to address it as a nation. Huis are inclusive and are recorded and shared publicly to promote transparency. While Huis cover a range of topics that are not always directly related to P/CVE, they remain an important opportunity to utilise dialogue to build trusting relationships between different stakeholders at the national and local levels.

3. *Build trusting and productive relationships between different stakeholders through dialogue and other trust building initiatives.*

A “whole of society” approach to P/CVE relies on productive relationships between actors, including national and local government officials, government and non-governmental stakeholders, police and communities, local government and the public, and different segments of the local population. Therefore, local and national actors should incorporate trust building initiatives into their P/CVE action plans that seek to identify and understand barriers to trust – especially those that undermine security or inhibit P/CVE efforts – and enhance trust between and among groups.

A “whole of society” approach should allow for contributions from a diversity of stakeholders. This includes frontline workers who engage directly with communities, such as city officials, educators and social, health, or youth workers. One common focus of trust building initiatives to strengthen P/CVE is on law enforcement, given the important role it can play in P/CVE and how it can provide a constructive link between counterterrorism and P/CVE efforts in the country.



When the police have a strained relationship with the community, it not only limits their effectiveness to ensure the safety and wellbeing of their community, but it can also actively undermine P/CVE efforts. For example, **Mozambique** was struggling with this challenge when the national government partnered with UNDP to launch the '[Immediate Stabilization in Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique](#)' program in 2023. Violent extremists in Mozambique have long exploited and exacerbated trust deficits between local communities and security forces to bolster recruitment. Therefore, along with several other efforts to strengthen peace, security and development, the 'Immediate Stabilization in Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique' program provided training for police and security forces to better prepare them to engage with and support communities and rebuild trust. This program demonstrates the importance of incorporating **capacity** building into trust building initiatives, especially when addressing relationships characterized by a long history of mistrust. Providing training and resources demonstrates a commitment to their success and fosters trust in national support.

In addition to police training, governments can further bolster trust by creating opportunities for police to build relationships with communities where trust is low. One such example can be found in **Boston**, Massachusetts, USA where the [Youth and Police Initiative Plus \(YPIP\)](#) program was established in 2018 to "build trust between youth and police officers while fostering community resilience to radicalization among Somali youth in the Boston area." The program was implemented by a multisectoral consortium of actors including the National Police Foundation's Center for Mass Violence Response Studies (CMVRS), the Boston Police Department, the North American Family Institute, and United Somali Youth. The program included several sessions for youth and police officers to share their perspectives and learn more about one another, along with their respective concerns and needs.

"National and local governments should establish or strengthen trust-based relationships with key local community stakeholders and build or strengthen existing P/CVE conducive to terrorism collaboration mechanisms at different levels." Good Practice 6

It may also be necessary for governments to invest in building trust between different religious, ethnic, or other groups, especially where historical tensions have resulted in violence. Particularly where such communal mistrust risks undermining public security, governments and community partners should consider investing in initiatives that address tensions between different groups to prevent violence, promote social cohesion and forge productive, cooperative relationships and communication that can help support local P/CVE activities. Such initiatives can be enhanced through partnerships with community leaders or organizations that have established trusting relationships with the target communities. This underscores the importance of consistent engagement with community stakeholders so that those relationships are strong enough when governments turn to them for support when a crisis emerges.

In **Indonesia**, the Ministries of Religion and Home Affairs formed [Inter-Religious Harmony Forums \(FKUB\)](#) in cities across Indonesia. FKUBs are made up of representatives of official religions and community members who are recognized or respected as leaders and role models. Intended to build and maintain harmonious religious communities, they advise different levels of government on inter-religious relations, arbitrating among different religious communities in Indonesia. Much like Uzbekistan's *mahallas*, FKUBs are an important community structure that has been woven into



Indonesia's P/CVE approach, providing an important resource for NLC. In addition to building trust among different religious groups and facilitating more productive engagements with government, FKUBs are also a good example of an **inclusive** mechanism to support NLC.

P/CVE stakeholders should be mindful that they are investing in building trusting relationships regularly, not only in response to a particular crisis or when friction emerges. To help build closer relationships with their residents and communities, government representatives should expand opportunities to access and engage with them. Local government in particular can strengthen its relationship with its residents by convening regular meetings where they can raise and discuss issues of concern with city officials. This then provides local government the opportunity to work with their residents to identify solutions to some of the city's most pressing challenges.

For example, the district of **Budvar**, Hungary regularly connects with its citizens through bi-weekly town hall meetings⁴ where interested residents learn about and discuss prominent community issues. The meetings are convened by the mayor, creating a direct line of communication between local political leadership, relevant local stakeholders and communities. While the town hall meetings cover a variety of topics, they contribute to local P/CVE efforts by providing a regular forum for community engagement and building a rapport that local leaders can use both as a resource for prevention – to announce programs or address concerns – and for response to provide clarity and comfort in the event of a violent extremism related incident.

Municipal officials in **Ajloun, Jordan**⁵ also regularly organize townhall meetings to connect with community members. The meetings provide citizens with a forum to discuss their concerns, stay up to date with new developments and connect with other members of the community. City officials also use the meetings to share lectures and seminars that emphasize principles of tolerance, coexistence, and solidarity. These meetings, therefore, are not only a way for city officials to build relationships with their citizens, but to promote a sense of community and facilitate residents building relationships with one another.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR ENHANCING TRUST:

- Building trust takes time, especially if there is a history of mistrust to overcome. Rather than one-off meetings or activities, government leaders should, as a matter of course, seek to nurture a common understanding and build more productive working relationships between stakeholders over time.
- A commitment to transparency can help enhance trust and buy-in for P/CVE policies and activities. Governments should consider providing access – through a public website – to strategies and related documents, making them available in all relevant languages. They should also, where possible, document and share the processes of strategy development, implementation and evaluation.
- Actors involved in P/CVE efforts should strengthen trust by enhancing accountability and transparency. This includes commissioning independent assessments of P/CVE frameworks and activities that incorporate feedback from partners and beneficiaries and increasing awareness about ongoing activities by documenting and sharing, where possible, the results of meetings or events related to P/CVE efforts.

⁴ Information for this case study was provided directly to Strong Cities by city officials in Budvar.

⁵ Information for this case study was presented during a Strong Cities Webinar, "A prevention guide for cities: Draft Framework" on 24 May 2023.



- Civil society and community organizations can bolster trust by sharing with the public information about the structure, funding, processes and outcomes of P/CVE frameworks and initiatives.
- Strong, productive, reciprocal relationships are a critical ingredient for effective and sustainable P/CVE, as well as for responding to violent incidents and mitigating the damage they can cause to the social fabric of the targeted city or communities. Therefore, trust building should be prioritized both proactively and reactively. The more attention these efforts receive as part of the regular course of business the more likely that these relationships can be leveraged in crisis situations, e.g., in the aftermath of a violent extremist incident.
- Governments should work to ensure that all stakeholders, but particularly frontline actors, have the necessary training to build and maintain trusting relationships at all levels, including with communities and particularly with young people and other vulnerable populations such as women, older demographics and other equity-seeking groups.
- Governments should be mindful to engage with communities, particularly those where feelings of marginalization and exclusion might be the strongest, in good faith to exchange ideas and build meaningful relationships, not merely to gather information about threats. The latter can undermine trust and contribute to the securitization of P/CVE, including by reinforcing the perception that particular religious, ethnic, national or other marginalized groups are seen as threats to security.
- Particularly when trust between actors is strained, it is important to remember that the objective of trust building exercises is not necessarily for all parties to agree. Instead, it may be more important for all parties to hear and understand each other's perspective and establish common goals and open up a safe space for dialogue.
- When navigating potentially hostile relationships between diverse groups or actors, P/CVE actors should consider employing an independent third-party to host and mediate (e.g., an international or multilateral organization) at a neutral location.
- To enhance trust, P/CVE actors and frontline workers should invest in building relationships that are based on direct personal experience, ethical considerations, and common goals, rather than perceptions or political, ethnic, religious or tribal allegiance.



Chapter 2: Inclusivity

Inclusivity is a key ingredient for effective NLC, as well as a by-product of it. To be inclusive, P/CVE efforts should incorporate the expertise, insights and experiences from a range of stakeholders at national and local levels, including government agencies, civil society, community leaders, the private sector, the public, as well as international actors where relevant.

To enhance NLC, P/CVE efforts should be inclusive at all stages, providing mechanisms that allow community members to offer input in a variety of ways and are sensitive to different languages, cultural norms, and ways of gathering and sharing information. This includes:

- During the development of strategies and programming to identify threats and opportunities, elicit buy-in from key stakeholders and beneficiaries and ensure frameworks and projects reflect local needs and priorities.
- During strategy and program implementation to give ownership and build credibility and trust.
- Throughout the evaluation of strategies and programs to understand their impact and identify gaps and learnings. This includes soliciting feedback from target communities that is diverse and representative.
- During revisions to existing frameworks to address gaps and ensure strategies remain relevant as threats and needs evolve.

This chapter outlines different approaches to enhance NLC by making P/CVE efforts more inclusive at the national and local levels.

KEY CONSIDERATIONS:

- Inclusion should be representative and meaningful, rather than tokenistic, for example by involving local actors in the planning and design of P/CVE strategies and policies.
- Some groups, particularly from historically marginalized communities, may be unwilling to engage honestly and openly with government representatives. In this case, governments may need to work with trusted intermediaries, such as community leaders or organizations or multilaterals.
- Take into account the need for gender-sensitivity and ensure the representation of women and other marginalized groups (for example youth) in all stages of P/CVE efforts. This can lead to more effective strategies that address the specific needs and vulnerabilities of diverse communities.
- Governments and other actors involved in P/CVE work may have unconscious biases that impact interactions with marginalized communities. A concerted effort may be needed to identify and address biases to ensure that this work takes into account and does not exacerbate structural inequalities.
- Inclusion should not be a “one-off” exercise. Instead, governments should consider establishing bodies or mechanisms that incorporate inclusion into P/CVE on an ongoing basis. This recognizes that building trust takes time and sustained effort and that it is important to maintain a long-term commitment to engage with local actors and communities to demonstrate reliability and dedication.
- Each stakeholder will have a unique contribution to make and may face particular barriers. Inclusion mechanisms and initiatives should take a tailored approach to each to ensure they can make the greatest possible contribution.



- Inclusion can also improve trust and enhance coordination between national and local actors. Those involved in P/CVE work should consider all the possible benefits of inclusion when designing and inclusion mechanisms or initiatives to best serve P/CVE objectives.

RELEVANT GCTF GOOD PRACTICES:

- **Good Practice 1:** Identify the barriers or other challenges to national-local cooperation.
 - **Good Practice 2:** Identify, delineate, and respect the comparative advantages of the different levels of P/CVE conducive to terrorism actors.
 - **Good Practice 3:** Lead an inclusive, consultative, multi-layered, national dialogue on P/CVE conducive to terrorism.
 - **Good Practice 4:** Develop and promote an inclusive national P/CVE conducive to terrorism framework that reflects the perspectives of a diversity of national and local government and non-government actors.
 - **Good Practice 5:** Invest in local actors, frameworks, and programs.
1. *Local governments should conduct inclusive mapping and research to build a more accurate and shared understanding of the threats from violent extremism and terrorism, as well as the opportunities to address them at the local and national levels.*

Local governments' proximity and access to their residents leave them best placed to get a clear understanding of the most salient threats and challenges they are facing and engage them on P/CVE-related issues. Therefore, a crucial role of local governments in NLC is capturing the perspectives and needs of their communities to ensure they are accounted for, both in local level strategic frameworks and policies and in those at the national level. To do this accurately, local governments should take an evidence-led approach that incorporates research and maps the needs, challenges and perceptions present in the target communities. Wherever possible, these mapping efforts should be inclusive, drawing on the expertise, insights and experiences of stakeholders at all levels, including the public, as well as members of the target audience, to establish a critical foundation for NLC. Inclusive mapping creates opportunities to:

- Craft and agree on shared terminology and definitions;
- Develop a common understanding of threats and opportunities that bridge differing perspectives to inform strategic frameworks;
- Recognize the role (and comparative advantages) of different stakeholders and encourage buy-in for strategic frameworks and activities;
- Build productive and trusting working relationships; and
- Identify existing resources and mechanisms that can be harnessed for P/CVE, including those that are informal and community-led and thus be unknown to by government officials.

"Identify, where possible, key drivers to violent extremism conducive to terrorism to develop a common understanding of where policies, resources, and efforts should be focused. This should be based on research and data on drivers in different parts of the country, as well as on what has worked to make some localities more resilient than others. It should also acknowledge, where appropriate, the need to address long-term structural injustices, poor



governance, and other evidence-based drivers of violent extremism conducive to terrorism.” Good Practice 4

An example of city-led inclusive research can be found in **London**, UK. There, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) undertook a “comprehensive listening exercise” with thousands of community members, stakeholders and experts across the city to help shape its P/CVE strategy, the Shared Endeavor Program. The exercise sought to “hear the voices of those who, in the past, have not been heard but who are the most important to listen to” and prioritised input from “minority and marginalised communities, women and young people.” MOPAC organized stakeholder meetings, round tables and workshops with law enforcement, local authorities, civil society groups, charities, think tanks, regulatory bodies and members of different communities. It also provided a six-week window for anyone in London to comment on or contribute to the program. The results of this mapping led to a series of recommendations, which are captured in a public [report](#) available on MOPAC’s website, demonstrating commitment to [transparency](#). MOPAC’s mapping not only engaged a wide variety of stakeholders, but also offered many ways for participants to input, giving the exercise both breadth and depth.

MOPAC’s mapping exercise also presents good practice in navigating [trust](#) deficits with target communities that may have been exacerbated as a result of the central government’s P/CVE approach. The UK’s national Prevent strategy has [exacerbated distrust](#) among some target communities, leaving some important target groups wary of engaging in an open discussion with government representatives about violent extremism and how best to address it. To overcome this barrier, MOPAC partnered with grassroots organizations, and collaboration that helped ensure participation from critical groups in the mapping, both strengthening the evidence base of the local P/CVE framework that resulted and contributing to rebuilding fractured relationships.

Iraq also undertook an inclusive [mapping exercise](#) to inform the development of local P/CVE action plans in seven governorates across the country. The first of these plans was launched in Ninewa in early 2023 and showcases the country’s commitment to an inclusive and “whole of society” approach. The government of Ninewa worked closely with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to prepare the strategy, a process which included a consultative mapping of key drivers of violent extremism with representatives from the national and local government, as well as civil society and community actors. The mapping gave priority to youth and women to understand their needs and challenges and ensure underrepresented segments of society would be served by the new action plan. Each governorate will employ this inclusive mapping exercise to ensure their action plans are evidence based and leverage local perspectives in support of Iraq’s National Strategy to Combat Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism.

“Local governments should, where appropriate, work with local-level stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, and researchers to develop local P/CVE conducive to terrorism plans and/or programs that reflect local risks and priorities, with tailored local plans and programs.” Good Practice 5



2. National and local governments should pursue an inclusive approach to drafting and revising strategic frameworks.

A sustained commitment to NLC for P/CVE should be reflected in a country's national and local strategic frameworks. These documents should not only emphasize the importance of NLC to create fertile ground for their localized implementation, but also be informed by NLC in their development to ensure they reflect and effectively serve the often diverse P/CVE needs of the entire country. To accomplish this, national and local governments should pursue an inclusive approach to drafting, evaluating and revising strategic frameworks. An inclusive approach should incorporate the needs, perspectives, experiences and abilities of a range of P/CVE actors at all levels, as well as the target beneficiaries of P/CVE initiatives.

"[An inclusive dialogue] should incorporate perspectives from the local level to gain institutional knowledge and local contextual expertise including for the purpose of informing development of a NAP or revising an existing one. It should encourage the NAP or other relevant national framework to reflect the needs and priorities of the communities, both urban and rural, that the policy is intended to serve." Good Practice 3

Pakistan provides an example of a comprehensive consultation, conducted by Ministry of Interior's National Counter Terrorism Authority as part of the development of its [National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines](#). The drafters led 34 rounds of consultative meetings with actors from local government, religious leaders, academia, the media, law and civil society. This was followed by a workshop in which all the actors consulted were asked to submit three recommendations to inform the policy guidelines. As a final step, a steering committee comprised of national and local actors was tasked with evaluating, refining and transforming the proposals into an actionable guideline for local governments to use when designing their P/CVE responses and policies. Pakistan's approach was inclusive in the wide range of actors it included, but also in the ways in which those contributions were delivered and incorporated. This example is illustrative, not only for the breadth of its inclusion, but also for its depth, ensuring input is both representative and meaningful.

An important consideration for inclusivity is engaging with groups who are underrepresented in decision-making processes, especially when these groups are part of a strategy's intended beneficiaries. Therefore, national and local governments need to make a concerted effort to include their voices. **Togo** provides a useful example. When the national government developed its National Prevention of Violent Extremism Strategy in 2022, it prioritized ensuring that the needs and perspectives of women and children were reflected in the framework. To this end, Togo collaborated with UNDP to conduct consultations with these target groups to identify priority areas of concern, as well as interventions for reducing violent extremist threats.⁶

"Develop P/CVE conducive to terrorism NAPs or other relevant national frameworks that are based on a shared vision of relevant national and local

⁶ Information for this case study was provided directly to Strong Cities by representatives at UNDP.



stakeholders and provide regular opportunities for evaluation, adaptation, and evolution based on changing contexts” Good Practice 4

The examples from MOPAC, Pakistan and Togo demonstrate ways to include an array of contributors in the development of a strategy. However, it is also important to consider how to sustain this inclusivity following adoption. This includes ways to ensure P/CVE efforts remain relevant and governments continue to invest in sustaining and strengthening critical relationships for NLC. Therefore, governments should consider ways to incorporate inclusive consultations as an ongoing process that can help guide implementation and respond to threats, concerns, and needs as they evolve.

Some countries have addressed this by establishing dedicated consultative bodies. One such example is the [Federal Network for Prevention of Extremism and De-radicalization \(BNED\)](#) in **Austria**. When Austria’s federal government was developing its Strategy for the Prevention of Extremism and Deradicalization, it began by establishing a strategic and policy advisory network, the BNED. Coordinated and financed by the federal-level Directorate State Protection and Intelligence Service (DSN), the BNED includes representatives from federal ministries, Austria’s nine states, the association of cities and municipalities, civil society organizations and experts from science and research. Although originally created to inform the elaboration of a strategy, members continue to meet bi-annually to discuss issues related to P/CVE and have the ability to organize additional meetings as needed. They also contribute to the Ministry of Interior’s annual “prevention summit”. Additionally, BNED has established working groups devoted to specific topics to coordinate and advise on some of Austria’s most salient violent extremism challenges. The BNED is also a useful example of **sustainability**. It is funded by the DSN, which helps ensure its continuity, and is multisectoral, which helps it transcend politicization that could disrupt its activities when there is a change of government.

Kyrgyzstan has also established multisectoral consultative bodies that not only allow it to facilitate an inclusive approach to the implementation of its national P/CVE framework, but one that is based at the local level. With support from the joint EU-UNDP STRIVE Asia project, the national government established nine [Community Advisory Groups](#) across the country. Each group includes a broad range of community representatives including youth, women, religious leaders, law enforcement and local government. In addition to providing local information and perspectives, each group has dedicated funding to deliver P/CVE related activities and works collaboratively to identify threats from violent extremism and radicalization to violence, craft responses and deliver P/CVE activities. Overall, these groups provide an example of how inclusive community bodies can help inform strategic frameworks, shape P/CVE implementation locally and support **coordination** between national and local actors.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCLUSIVITY:

- Governments should actively seek input, such as by using surveys, interviews, and focus groups, from a wide range of stakeholders when developing P/CVE frameworks. This includes law enforcement, frontline practitioners, civil society, religious and other community leaders, grassroots activists, and the public at large
- Governments should make a concerted effort to include people from those parts of the population that are most likely to be the targeted population of P/CVE efforts. This could include historically marginalized or minority populations. It is important to remember that these groups may not immediately volunteer their participation. Therefore, government stakeholders will



need to strategize how to overcome any barriers to inclusion – including physical or language-related -- and incorporate adequate sensitization efforts.

- Governments should consider working with trusted local partners – such as community leaders or other members of civil society – who can help reduce trust deficits and ensure meaningful participation from those who may be otherwise reticent to speak about these issues.
- When governments are drafting strategic frameworks or action plans, in addition to soliciting targeted input, they should consider allocating time for open feedback where the public can submit comments, with the relevant government decision-makers then considering the submissions.



Chapter 3: Coordination

Regular coordination is at the core of NLC. To be fully realized, a “whole of society” approach should consistently cohere contributions from a multitude of actors at different levels and sectors. It needs to do so in a way that both offers the flexibility of localized approaches and is harmonized to serve national objectives. Extensive coordination, vertically and horizontally between actors and sectors at local, national and regional levels is thus critical. This can be achieved through dedicated centers, networks or bodies, or coalesced through individuals in appointed positions; however, there is no one-size-fits all solution and the approach chosen should be tailored to reflect the specific political, legal, cultural, and historical context. It should also build upon and complement existing structures. The following chapter will present different approaches to enhance NLC by strengthening coordination between sectors and between different levels.

KEY CONSIDERATIONS:

- Coordination mechanisms should support a “whole of society” approach and work to align not only government agencies and officials, but also P/CVE actors from other sectors and harness contributions from the public wherever relevant.
- To be sustainable and best serve P/CVE-related NLC, coordination efforts should, wherever possible, utilize existing bodies and positions, rather than creating entirely new structures dedicated to P/CVE.
- Coordination mechanisms should be a technical function of the government, not a political one. This can help prevent politicization that may exclude participation from localities governed by opposing parties and undermine sustainability when there is a change of government.

RELEVANT GCTF GOOD PRACTICES:

- **Good Practice 2:** Identify, delineate, and respect the comparative advantages of the different levels of P/CVE conducive to terrorism actors.
- **Good Practice 4:** Develop and promote an inclusive national P/CVE conducive to terrorism framework that reflects the perspectives of a diversity of national and local government and non-government actors.
- **Good Practice 5:** Invest in local actors, Coordination mechanisms should support a “whole of society” approach and work to align not only government agencies and officials, but also P/CVE actors from other sectors and harness contributions from the public wherever relevant.
- **Good Practice 8:** Enable and promote effective coordination, communication, and collaboration among national and local stakeholders relevant to the design and implementation of a P/CVE conducive to terrorism NAP or other relevant national framework.

1. *The national government should create a dedicated national coordination mechanism for P/CVE*

Many countries have put in place national coordination offices, centers, or other entities that serve as dedicated hubs for coordinating P/CVE efforts. They can serve as hubs for gathering and sharing information, harnessing and supporting the efforts of actors across levels and sectors, forging connections between stakeholders, engaging with international actors, and guiding evaluation and review.

National coordination bodies should engage all levels of government to facilitate cooperation and provide for localized delivery in support of national objectives. **Australia’s [Countering Violent Extremism Sub-Committee \(CVESC\)](#)**, for example works across all levels of government in the Australian federal system to support NLC. Positioned at the national level, it coordinates P/CVE



activities among federal, state, territorial and local actors. This inclusion of actors from all levels allows the CVESC to tailor P/CVE activities while maintaining a national-level view of policies and programs that promotes cooperation and minimizes duplication or overlap.

“Identify a lead office or agency within the national government and provide clarity as to the roles, responsibilities, objectives, and priorities of those expected to be involved in supporting its implementation and M&E, including at the local level.” Good Practice 4

Wherever possible, coordination mechanisms should look beyond government representatives and incorporate other P/CVE actors, including from civil society, academia, and/or the private sector, as well as non-P/CVE actors such as frontline workers or community leaders who have regular engagement with residents.

Albania and Finland provide different examples of how a national government can take a comprehensive “whole of society” approach to P/CVE coordination that supports NLC. In **Albania**, the [Coordination Center for Countering Violent Extremism \(CVE Center\)](#) is the lynchpin for coordinating efforts to implement the national P/CVE strategy and the country’s PCVE work more broadly. The CVE Center is led by the National P/CVE Coordinator and is organized into two departments – education and research affairs and civil society and security affairs – representing critical perspectives for P/CVE. It is responsible for coordinating all P/CVE activities, nationally, locally and internationally. This includes research, interventions, reintegration, project implementation, supporting implementation by other actors and sectors, capacity building for front line practitioners, evaluation and reviews, reporting to the prime minister and working with regional and international experts. The CVE Center has allowed Albania to pursue a multisectoral approach as the body works across the country to engage a broad spectrum of national and local P/CVE actors. This includes prison and probation services, local governments, education institutions, civil society organizations, and police and security services. The CVE Centre also provides training to ensure actors at every level have the **capacity** to support P/CVE objectives and has a dedicated [website](#) where it publicly discloses information about its structure, funding, and processes, showing a commitment to **transparency** and promoting **information sharing**.

In **Finland**, the primary coordination mechanism for P/CVE is the [National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism \(NCN\)](#). Managed by Finland’s Ministry of Interior, the NCN helped ensure that the drafting of Finland’s first national P/CVE framework, along with subsequent updates, was **inclusive**. It also coordinates implementation, harnessing the efforts of a wide range of actors including municipal officials and practitioners, as well as front-line workers, civil society, academia, and the national police, security and intelligence services. The NCN provides a range of resources and support, including research, interventions and **capacity building** programs, while promoting local actors and their work and building relationships with local communities to enhance **trust**.

In both examples above, the coordination body is responsible for overseeing and coordinating P/CVE, but also enabling it. It facilitates information sharing, supports locally led implementation and provides critical training to enhance the capacity of front-line practitioners and local actors. This kind of comprehensive approach to national coordination helps not only spark but **sustain** P/CVE-related NLC.



2. Local and national governments should work together to establish local coordination mechanisms that facilitate locally led P/CVE in support of national objectives.

Local coordination mechanisms are also crucial to facilitate NLC. They provide a single point to organize and collate the input and activities of local actors, easing coordination both for local implementation and for coordination with the national government.

Local coordination bodies can:

- Connect local stakeholders – from across government and civil society – to discuss and address issues of concern to local communities and pursue cooperative solutions.
- Coordinate information gathering and sharing to both inform local actors and help ensure local perspectives and needs are communicated to the national level.
- Provide or facilitate the delivery of relevant capacity building that is tailored to relevant front-line workers and community actors.
- Manage and disperse funding for locally led P/CVE initiatives.

Local coordination bodies can be overseen by either national or local governments. For example, in **Indonesia**, the Provincial/District Governments, through their National Unity and Politics Offices (Kesbangpol), are responsible for the coordination, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of P/CVE activities at the local level. This includes the facilitation of **trust building** between local actors, **communication**, including gathering and sharing data and intelligence with the national government, and implementing reintegration programmes for radicalised individuals. Kesbangpol is designed to serve as a bridge between the national and local level, facilitating communications between the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) and the range of local actors responsible for P/CVE initiatives in each relevant province or city, including regional and local government, civil society, religious and traditional leaders, and youth.

In **Kenya**, on the other hand, several counties, with encouragement and support from the national government, have created [County Engagement Forums](#) (CEFs) to coordinate the delivery and evaluation of their P/CVE County Action Plans (CAPs). While the structure and make-up vary per county, they are all co-chaired by the County Commissioner, who is appointed by the national government, and the elected, County Governor. They bring together a variety of local actors, including representatives from county government, civil society, the private sector, religious leaders, traditional elders, youth groups, women's groups, as well as officials from the National Counter Terrorism Center. Additionally, CEFs typically work closely with other county structures and stakeholders including interfaith bodies, youth groups and private sector organizations to better understand the needs, priorities and capabilities of the relevant local communities. Kenya's CEFs are critical to facilitating the localized and **inclusive** implementation of the national P/CVE framework.

3. Utilize existing structures to enhance coordination.

A “whole of society” approach to P/CVE is important because it draws on a multitude of stakeholders for whom P/CVE may not be their primary role – including those who have limited to no background in the issues – but whose contribution is critical to its successful implementation. This includes:

- Frontline workers like social, health, and youth workers, and teachers; and
- Community leaders such as religious and tribal and respected members of community groups.

Therefore, where possible, P/CVE coordination should draw upon the structures and forums that exist to coordinate these stakeholders and the services they provide. This will enhance cooperation, limit



redundancy and greatly enhance **sustainability**, as it draws support for P/CVE through existing structures that typically have already had the support from key P/CVE stakeholders and, at times, dedicated resources.

“Include a focus on the role that municipalities and other local actors can play in translating national P/CVE conducive to terrorism policies into action. This might involve, for example, identifying existing local structures or programs that may function as key vehicles for tailored local implementation of these policies.” Good Practice 4

In **Kosovo**, the Ministry of Internal Affairs utilized existing structures when it established the [Division for Prevention and Reintegration of Radicalized Persons \(DPRRP\)](#) to implement the National Strategy for Sustainable Reintegration of Repatriated Persons in Kosovo. While R&R is still largely centralized within the national government, the national strategy emphasizes the need to devolve some competences to incentivize active participation from local authorities and social services in this work. To facilitate this, one of the DPRRP’s functions is to coordinate a localized response through existing public services provided by local governments, local bodies – such as Community Safety Councils and Centers for Social Work – and other expertise from civil society and the private sector.

In **Germany**, the project "[Model municipalities for deradicalisation ‘MoDeRad’](#)" supports local authority actors in districts, cities and municipalities in further developing multiprofessional structures and municipal prevention work against radicalization to violent extremism and for social cohesion.

“Local governments should, where appropriate, work with local-level stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, and researchers to address P/CVE conducive to terrorism priorities or needs through a broader resilience, social cohesion, violence, or crime-prevention model or other existing framework.” Good Practice 5

An Integrated Approach to Prevention (Case Study Box)

New York City

The City of New York took a coordinated approach when then Mayor DeBlasio created [Office for the Prevention of Hate Crimes \(OPHC\)](#) in September 2019. Housed in the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice, the OPHC is tasked with developing and coordinating community-led prevention strategies to address issues related to hate, violent extremism, polarization and social cohesion. It does this in part by overseeing an interagency committee comprised of more than 20 city agencies and five NYC District Attorney Hate Crime Units, as well as networks of community-based organizations. In addition to its coordination function, the OPHC plays other roles in supporting local P/CVE.

- **Capacity building:** providing training and resources to community organizations and law enforcement and educational materials for students through the Department of Education.
- **Communication:** both gathering and sharing information about hate crimes and violent extremism, as well as the city’s planned responses.



- **Sustainability:** its integration of P/CVE into community structures has helped ensure its continuity after Mayor DeBlasio's administration left office.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COORDINATION:

- National governments should look to ensure that there is a coordination center or body that can facilitate, organize, and support P/CVE efforts at all levels and ensure both efforts are aligned with relevant national frameworks and actions plans.
- Local governments should look to ensure that there is an office responsible for coordinating, facilitating, and/or otherwise supporting local implementation of relevant national and local P/CVE frameworks. This can be done at the regional or city level and with differing levels of collaboration with the national government. Emphasis should be placed on engaging with community-level stakeholders and encouraging community-led initiatives.
- Wherever possible, governments should integrate P/CVE into existing structures that were developed to address other issues of concern, such as crime, public safety, community well-being, or violence, in order to limit redundancy, maximize synergies and enhance sustainability.

While coordination bodies are important for sustained NLC, governments should also consider identifying and mandating an individual or a group, department, task force of individuals within the government who is respected by a diverse set of relevant stakeholders to oversee coordination and implementation of P/CVE frameworks.



Chapter 4: Communication

Communication is crucial for NLC. A “whole of society” approach can only function when local and national actors across sectors can communicate effectively to share information about threats and coordinate responses, while ensuring the protection of sensitive information and individual privacy rights.

There are three aspects of P/CVE-related communication that can enable effective NLC.

Information sharing: mechanisms that enable the timely and consistent sharing of information between national and local government, and, as appropriate, civil society and community stakeholders, while respecting privacy rights. This includes gathering and sharing pertinent information about threats to inform and coordinate responses and updates on activities and implementation of strategic frameworks.

Awareness-raising: efforts to ensure P/CVE stakeholders at all levels are aware of and familiar with strategic frameworks – the threats underpinning them – and their role in supporting their implementation. Dedicated awareness raising improves opportunities for collaboration, since it provides local stakeholders the chance to understand and engage with national frameworks and can enhance sustainability by building buy-in across different levels of government and, where appropriate, community-based actors.

Strategic communication: public-facing campaigns that increase awareness of terrorism and violent extremism-related threats and what national and local governments are doing to address them. Delivered through campaigns that are formal, creative, artistic, attributed and un-attributed, strategic communication can help secure public support for P/CVE strategies and activities and buy-in from their intended beneficiaries, thus bolstering their effectiveness and enhancing their sustainability.

National and local governments should ensure that communication is a pillar of their P/CVE strategies. All communication should be done in a way that maximizes efficiency and minimizes risk, while avoiding stigma, and respecting a human-rights-based and “Do No Harm” approach that protects national security and individual privacy.

KEY CONSIDERATIONS:

- Local government and other local P/CVE stakeholders, including frontline workers, can only support national P/CVE objectives if they are aware of relevant national frameworks and their roles in executing them.
- Clear and consistent lines of communication are crucial to share timely information about threats and coordinate responses. This will often require both regular forums to meet and discuss ongoing issues, as well as more immediate “emergency” lines to report acute threats as they evolve. In both cases, national and local actors should incorporate safeguards to ensure an unbiased, non-discretionary approach and mitigate potential risks to national security and individual privacy protections when reporting and discussing threats.
- Local actors, especially those working at the community level, are best placed to have access to and thus provide information about local realities to inform local and national strategic frameworks and adapt them as needed. They are also well situated to identify threats and provide early warnings.
- Information sharing between national and local government and between government and non-governmental actors should be cooperative, flowing in both directions. It should not only



utilize local P/CVE stakeholders to gather data and report on their locality, but also empower them to play a substantial role in P/CVE.

- Public communication about P/CVE strategic frameworks, action plans and activities supports transparency and can enhance buy-in and participation from relevant stakeholders as well as the public.
- Information sharing should be carefully calibrated to enable cooperation between sectors and levels without jeopardizing national security or undermining the human rights of individuals in targeted communities, including privacy rights. .
- National and local stakeholders should work together to promote credible and accurate information to mitigate the negative impact of misinformation and disinformation.

RELEVANT GCTF GOOD PRACTICES:

- **Good Practice 7:** Facilitate appropriate information sharing between P/CVE conducive to terrorism actors while protecting privacy.
- **Good Practice 8:** Enable and promote effective coordination, communication, and collaboration among national and local stakeholders relevant to the design and implementation of a P/CVE conducive to terrorism NAP or other relevant national framework.

1. National governments should prioritize information sharing between P/CVE actors at local, national and regional levels.

Information sharing is essential for NLC. National governments need information about local realities to shape national frameworks and activities and respond to threats as they arise. At the same time, local P/CVE stakeholders require an accurate picture of the threat landscape and information about P/CVE strategies and activities across the country to be in a position to support national objectives and effectively serve their beneficiaries.

National governments should remember that, to support meaningful NLC, information sharing should be reciprocal, – flowing in both directions – and not only utilize local P/CVE stakeholders to gather data and report on their locality, but also empower them to play a substantial role in P/CVE. Information sharing should include, where relevant and appropriate:

- Information about threats from the local, national, regional and international spheres. P/CVE actors at all levels benefit from having a full picture of the threat environment. This includes local threats, which are often best documented by local government and community actors, and national, regional and international threats, which are typically monitored by national government.
- Regular forums to maintain consistent coordination as well as early warning mechanisms to flag acute threats and individuals of immediate concern.
- Consistent access to strategic frameworks and associated documents for P/CVE actors at all levels.
- Information about the needs, challenges and grievances of specific communities. Local governments and other P/CVE stakeholders are well placed to gather this information and need clear and secure mechanisms to share it and ensure that it can be incorporated into national and local action plans.
- Feedback on national and local frameworks from their intended beneficiaries. Since the drafters of frameworks are often not directly involved in their implementation, there should be



mechanisms to transmit information about their effectiveness and reception in real time as part of their monitoring and evaluation.

A critical feature of information sharing for P/CVE is an early warning system that enables local and national actors to communicate efficiently and securely about new and ongoing threats. One such example can be found in **Ghana** where the national government and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established the [National Centre for Coordination of Early Warning and Response Mechanism \(NCCRM\)](#) “to warn the government of threats to human security, propose appropriate action and ensure monitoring of the implementation of response to the warning”. In this context, the NCCRM works to enhance information sharing and improve coordination between regional, national and local actors and serves as a platform for both collecting and dispersing information relevant to human security threats, including violent extremism. Data is fed into the centre from a network of actors across the country where it is consolidated, analysed and actioned. The centre then compiles regular monthly and quarterly security and situation reports, policy briefs, and other analyses which it shares with its national network, along with the ECOWAS Commission and its member states.

Ghana’s NCCRM is a crucial part of its nascent P/CVE infrastructure, but it is not dedicated to, let alone designed for, addressing violent extremism. Instead, violent extremism has been added to the list of threats on which it focuses. This kind of integrated approach, which relies on existing funding, support, and structures can help leverage limited resources, reduce duplication, streamline responses, and thus enhance the **sustainability** of P/CVE efforts. This approach can and should be replicated, where appropriate, at a local level by integrating P/CVE into existing local structures.

For example, in **Denmark**, [Info Houses](#) were originally established as crime prevention collaboration platforms in each of the 12 police regions across the country, have been expanded to include a P/CVE mandate. Each Info House operates primarily as a collaboration between police and the municipality, but they involve social, mental health, prison, and probation workers as needed. The Info Houses feature two forms of multi-agency collaboration for P/CVE. The first is “Info-house Municipality”, which focuses on assessing concerns regarding individuals who are identified as potentially being at risk, including of becoming radicalized to violence. The second is “Info-house Network”, which is responsible for sharing information on wider local and regional challenges and trends. Significantly, legal protections on information related to P/CVE restrict sharing with non-security personnel; however, there is an explicit legal exception allowing the relevant authorities to share otherwise protected information to prevent a crime. Info Houses also form an important communication link with the public. The Danish government launched a hotline in 2015 where individuals can report that someone they know is at risk of radicalisation to violence or has already crossed this threshold and can access advice and other information on how best to manage the situation.

Info Houses are also a good example of **coordination** between different national agencies to support localised prevention, including of violent extremism. A national-level steering committee and secretariat comprised of Danish National Police, the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing, Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration, The Security and Intelligence Service, [the Centre for Documentation and Counter Extremism](#), and the Board for Education and Quality advise and support Info Houses and coordinate among the different locations.



“Local governments should, where appropriate, work with local-level stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, and researchers to provide feedback to inform national-level policies and approaches based on their experience with local implementation.” Good Practice 5

In addition to local government and frontline workers, it is also important to communicate regularly with grassroots actors and civil society since they are often an important source of community level information. In **Indonesia**, a civil society organization – the [Indonesian Institute for Society Empowerment](#) (INSEP) – established the [Early Warning and Early Response System Preventing Violent Extremism](#) in 2019, a network of grassroots actors, including religious and community leaders, civil society, community-based organizations, educational institutions, government officials, and security forces that extends to subdistricts, villages, neighbourhoods and even families. It collects and disseminates information related to the “presence of violent extremist persons or groups or the potential for violent extremism to occur”. Information is then shared with national actors, in collaboration with the National Unity and Politics Offices (Kesbangpol). Since the Early Warning and Early Response System was established by civil society and is managed in [cooperation](#) with the government, rather than directly by the government, it can navigate the trust barriers that governments frequently encounter when gathering information from communities. To bolster and sustain the Early Warning System, the INSEP incorporated **capacity building**, providing training and a handbook with guidelines for identification and communication related to P/CVE.

“Local governments should, where appropriate, build working relationships within the country beyond local borders to help coordinate information sharing and P/CVE conducive to terrorism efforts across large regions.” Good Practice 8

2. National and local stakeholders should make a concerted effort to raise awareness about P/CVE strategic frameworks and activities among all actors.

In addition to sharing P/CVE frameworks and related documents with local stakeholders, national governments should invest in efforts to ensure they all share a common understanding about its content and their role in implementing it.

After the **Republic of North Macedonia** adopted its national strategy for countering violent extremism in 2018, the National Committee for Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism (NCCVECT) organized ten sessions with local government and civil society actors from across the country, as well as eight with law enforcement and mayors. These sessions were organized with support from the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Mission in Skopje and were part of a [strategic communications campaign](#) to raise awareness about the strategy and its goals, enhance **transparency**, ensure consistency in related messaging, and identify ways to ensure meaningful cooperation between national and local actors surrounding the implementation of the strategy. These awareness raising efforts can help align national and local actors and garner political will for a strategy that transcends political parties, thus enhancing a strategy’s **sustainability**.



“Efforts should be made to raise awareness, train, and otherwise engage, where appropriate, on P/CVE conducive to terrorism with national and local stakeholders to foster understanding and greater transparency of the agenda and minimize politicization of P/CVE conducive to terrorism.” Good Practice 12

In addition to increasing awareness among government stakeholders, national and local governments should consider ways to inform the public about P/CVE frameworks and related activities. This can be done in a number of ways, including dedicated campaigns or, as the government in **Tajikistan** has shown, through a [media engagement strategy](#). When Tajikistan adopted its National Strategy and Action Plan on PVE/CVE in 2017, the national government shared the strategy directly with all local level authorities and worked with the media to raise awareness about the plan with the public. Information was shared in Tajik, Russian and English to reach the widest possible audience and, the government has continued to share updates about implementation of the plan through periodic press briefings. This collaboration with the media to reach the public is also a good practice for [transparency](#).

In the **Philippines**, the national government worked with the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) to enhance its strategic communication about its national P/CVE framework.⁷ UNOCT has developed and launched a variety of P/CVE strategic communication products to support the implementation of NAPs. These are aimed at supporting government-led strategic communications at all levels, including through the coordination of the development of narratives by local and national actors. It partnered with the Government of the Philippines to deliver training on supporting consistent cross-institutional communications strategies related to NAP implementation at a local level, with a particular focus on managing communications during a crisis – including through the activation of a local-national communication strategy – to build resilience. Among other things, this effort facilitated the localisation of the NAP in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BAARM). During the workshop, officials from across government, co-created a national narrative on crisis, and initiated the development of a local-national crisis communication strategy.

“National governments should, where appropriate, include a communications strategy, elaborated where possible in collaboration with civil society and other local actors, within the national P/CVE conducive to terrorism framework to guide civil society and other local actors in developing the content of their programs, while tailoring strategies for marginalized and hard-to-reach rural communities to their needs.” Good Practice 8

Governments can also support P/CVE local stakeholders and enhance P/CVE-related NLC by providing consistent and easy access to P/CVE information. One step that national governments can take is to collate relevant information in a single place that is well indexed and searchable. The **US** Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did this with the launch of its [Prevention Resource Finder](#) in early 2023, a “one-stop shop for federal resources to prevent targeted violence and terrorism”. The platform, which is primarily targeted to local government and non-governmental actors, provides a collection of

⁷ Information for this case study was shared directly with Strong Cities by representatives at UNOCT.



resources, platforms and opportunities for support, funding, information sharing, research and training, with a particular focus on enabling more locally led prevention efforts. Such a platform allows users to identify and access a huge range of resources that would otherwise be scattered across dozens of departmental websites, making it easier for stakeholders to find and access the information they need.

DHS has also taken steps to increase awareness among the public about threats from violence and terrorism, as well as P/CVE through [Community Awareness Briefings](#) (CABs) that its Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) offers to communities around the United States. These are two-hour presentations about the violent extremism landscape and local prevention, offering information on how to access different prevention programs available locally and nationally. Notably, CABs are nationally designed and locally delivered, exemplifying NLC. As needed, a community actor, such as a teacher or religious leader, organizes a CAB and presents it using a set of resources and guidance developed by DHS that is available online.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMUNICATION:

- Governments should ensure relevant information related to violent extremist threats and P/CVE policies and action plans are available to those stakeholders whose involvement in P/CVE efforts is critical to their success.
- In addition to providing access, governments should make a concerted effort to raise awareness among frontline and community actors about relevant policy frameworks and action plans and their role in executing them, offering guidance, training, and other support as needed.
- Governments should implement communications campaigns to raise awareness about violent extremist threats and P/CVE strategies and programs among the public, especially the intended beneficiaries of P/CVE initiatives.
- National governments, with input from their local counterparts, should develop guidelines for sharing information between the national and local levels. This flow of information should go both ways, transmitting information about threats consistently, while respecting clearly defined national security prerogatives and individual privacy rights.
- To facilitate communication between national and local stakeholder that is both consistent and timely, national and local governments should consider establishing regular forums and protocols for responding to emergencies.
- To establish mechanisms that encourage and facilitate two-way communication. This means creating channels for feedback, input, and dialogue between governments, civil society, community actors, and other stakeholders.
- To create a system for monitoring and evaluating communication efforts. This involves assessing the impact of communication campaigns, understanding how messages are received and interpreted, and making data-driven adjustments to improve the effectiveness of communication strategies over time.



Chapter 5: Capacity

Uneven or otherwise limited capacity is a persistent impediment to effective and sustainable NLC. It is listed among the frequent challenges to NLC in the GCTF's *Memorandum* (Good Practice 1). Further, following a lack of trust, it was the most frequently cited barrier in the consultations conducted for this toolkit. In many contexts, stakeholders at all levels lack the skills, knowledge, experience, networks, and resources to contribute to P/CVE efforts. This is particularly so in instances where P/CVE measures or interventions are focused at the individual level. This is due to the need for P/CVE stakeholders to be able to navigate the heightened security risks that such P/CVE targets may pose to professionals with limited experience working with potentially dangerous individuals and avoid the stigma that can result if such interventions are not handled appropriately.

Addressing these gaps is thus essential for meaningful NLC to take root. Training and other capacity building help ensure that the diversity of actors needed to realize and sustain NLC are capable of playing their role, including whether engaging at a community or individual level. Given the range of stakeholders involved and skills to be enhanced, a diversity of capacity building programs that leverage the relevant expertise and experiences across different government, non-governmental, national and local actors – including civil society, academia, and the private sector – will need to be mobilized. Coordination among programs and actors is critical to ensuring key gaps are addressed and synergies are maximized.

Such capacity building activities should enable each relevant sector, profession, and level of government to understand and fulfill its appropriate role and responsibilities related to P/CVE in its country, city, and/or community. It should also help actors understand how their work fits into a “whole of society” approach to P/CVE and promotes NLC. With these goals at the forefront, training and other capacity building initiatives could usefully focus on, for example:

- Helping those who are new to the P/CVE field understand the concepts of violent extremism and radicalization that leads to violence, particularly to help familiarize them with the specific threats present in a given geographical setting.
- Designing P/CVE programs that adhere to a human-rights compliant and “Do No Harm” approach. This should emphasize NLC and give specific focus to multi-sectoral models that employ a “whole of society” approach.
- Helping local actors better understand national P/CVE frameworks and processes for supporting their implementation. This could include training for small organizations on how to apply for funds or where to report information or seek support and should include opportunities to build P/CVE-relevant experience and expand their portfolios.
- Enhancing project development and management capabilities. This is especially important for smaller, community-based organizations, but should also be offered to national and local government representatives who are responsible for managing P/CVE project portfolios.
- Strengthening M&E capabilities. This should focus on supporting national and local governments as well as non-governmental organizations to develop a clear theory of change and a set of evaluation tools that will enable them to assess and report on their impact. It should also be incorporated into training for government officials who are responsible for evaluating progress against P/CVE action plans.
- Building networks to allow CSOs, researchers, frontline practitioners and other relevant P/CVE stakeholders to share and learn from and collaborate with each other on an ongoing basis.

**KEY CONSIDERATIONS:**

- Capacity building programs should be based on actual needs and tailored to individual stakeholders. This will often require mapping to understand critical gaps among different P/CVE stakeholders.
- Training should cover a range of topics that are relevant to a stakeholder's role, including whether engaging at a community or individual level. This should include practical skill building related to the pursuit of multisectoral models that support NLC, project management, communication, M&E and more.
- Training should be provided on an ongoing basis to ensure participants can build relevant skills and knowledge in a sustained way (rather than through single-day seminars) and stay up to date on new developments and approaches.
- There is a wealth of good practice and tested models for building capacities in P/CVE that stakeholders can draw from when developing capacity building programs. Where appropriate, it is advisable to work with international actors to capitalize on existing models and resources from across different regions, countries, and contexts.
- Training should incorporate, where possible, practical exercises that enable participants to connect knowledge and skills with real-life application.

RELEVANT GCTF GOOD PRACTICES:

- **Good Practice 1:** Identify the barriers or other challenges to national-local cooperation.
- **Good Practice 2:** Identify, delineate, and respect the comparative advantages of the different levels of P/CVE conducive to terrorism actors.
- **Good Practice 5:** Invest in local actors, frameworks, and programs.
- **Good Practice 11:** Provide or otherwise support tailored training and other capacity building.
- **Good Practice 13:** Enable the effective and sustained monitoring and evaluation of national and local P/CVE conducive to terrorism initiatives.

1. *Capacity building specific to NLC should be provided for national and local government actors to guide them as they pursue a “whole of society” approach.*

As governments design and implement P/CVE frameworks and programs, they will need to draw upon knowledge, skills and good practice that is specific to NLC. This can include relevant themes like communication, information sharing and fund management, as well as established models for trust building, collaboration and designing multi-stakeholder approaches. Often, this kind of training and support can be provided by the international community.

It can be provided directly through targeted interventions. For example, GIZ (German Agency for International Cooperation) is working with AMBERO Consulting to deliver [specialized trainings](#) for municipal representatives in **Morocco** to engage civil society in dialogue to support P/CVE – a critical competency for NLC – as well as providing funding for local initiatives.

Or it can be provided at scale through resources, such as the International **Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law's** (IJ) training curriculum for [Developing Multi-Actor P/CVE Intervention Programmes](#) designed to help governments and others pursue multi-sector and multi-level collaboration as part of P/CVE.



2. *To enhance local involvement, build the capacity of actors from a variety of sectors who can contribute to P/CVE.*

A “whole of society” approach to P/CVE requires contributions from a wide variety of local stakeholders, including those who may not appreciate the contributions they can make to such an approach, or lack the specialized knowledge, skills, or resources to contribute. Therefore, investments in training and other capacity building should be made for local government and non-governmental actors.

It is particularly important to ensure that frontline workers whose work does not traditionally involve engaging on issues of violent extremism and who may be apprehensive about doing so can access the necessary training to build their capacity and confidence. Typically, this includes social, health, and youth workers, teachers, and community leaders, but it may apply to others, depending on the scope of the relevant P/CVE framework. While all frontline workers will benefit from basic P/CVE training to gain a broad understanding of threats and responses, a select number of workers from each sector should also receive more specialized training to ensure each sector can support specific P/CVE initiatives and interventions.

This was the case in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** (BiH), where, as part of its national Rehabilitation and Reintegration (R&R) strategy, the national government has invested in building the capacity of local social workers to work with returnees, particularly with children and with families of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (MLSP) worked closely with the OSCE Mission in BiH to develop and deliver specialized training to harness the social protection sector as a critical contributor to P/CVE efforts at a community and individual level. The MLSP adapted [PRIDE](#), an established training programme for foster families, to address the specific challenges experienced by returning FTFs and their families. Further, it leveraged its existing pool of licensed PRIDE trainers who rolled out the training for more than 60 social protection professionals across the country. MLSP and the OSCE Mission in BiH continue to organize periodical trainings for the PRIDE trainers to further strengthen their skills and ensure effective implementation of R&R programs. Inspired by this program’s success, authorities in the Republic of Serbia invited trainers from BiH to deliver this training to members of their local multidisciplinary R&R teams. This example shows the potential for adapting existing capacity building models to meet P/CVE needs, the critical role the national government plays in facilitating the upskilling of local actors, and the value of regional **coordination** to scale up efforts to meet shared challenges.

“National governments should, where appropriate, incentivize and provide training and resources to local actors whose skill sets could be utilized in the P/CVE conducive to terrorism realm.” Good Practice 5

As the BiH example shows, the national government is often well placed to identify capacity building needs and coordinate a response but may benefit from partnering with a non-governmental entity to provide necessary expertise to address them. In both **Canada** and the **US**, the federal government turned to a university to support the creation of new initiatives. The Canadian government worked with the University of Quebec in Montreal to establish the [Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence \(CPN-PREV\)](#). CPN-PREV is the main national mechanism to bring together experts who work with vulnerable/at-risk individuals to steer them away from involvement in violent extremism, through sustained knowledge mobilization between



researchers, practitioners, policymakers, and various community sectors. In the **US**, the government supported the Arizona State University's McCain Institute to launch the [Prevention Practitioners' Network \(PPN\)](#), with support from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, and oversees its activities. The PPN is an interdisciplinary network of P/CVE, violence prevention, mental health, and ethics professionals, and provides training and resources tailored to different kinds of practitioners, including local and state agencies. The training covers a range of themes and skillsets, e.g., conducting behavioural needs assessments and staffing and legal considerations when building a multi-stakeholder prevention team.

“National governments should, where appropriate provide training, in collaboration with other relevant P/CVE conducive to terrorism stakeholders”
Good Practice 8

In the **UK**, civil society and the private sector have worked to help fill critical gaps in teachers' capacities. The UK's national P/CVE strategy, Prevent, includes a [Prevent duty](#) for school and childcare providers to identify and support young people who are identified as being at risk of radicalization to violent extremism and promote resilience. This statutory duty is intended to complement existing safeguarding duties; however, the nature of the content meant these front-line workers often required additional training to carry out their duty. The UK provided a range of guidance, resources and training, available online through its [Educate Against Hate](#) platform. To complement the national government's training efforts and help meet this immense need, local governments⁸, CSOs⁹, and private companies¹⁰ across the UK have developed and led specialised training for teachers, childcare workers, and social workers to help them fulfil their Prevent duty.

Sweden consolidated its support for different national and local P/CVE stakeholders through the [Swedish Center of Preventing Violent Extremism](#). Operating under the auspices of the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå), the Center works to “strengthen and develop” P/CVE efforts, including by advancing “knowledge-based and cross-sectoral work involved in preventing violent extremism on the national, regional, and local levels in Sweden.” One way it does this is by acting as a knowledge hub, producing and disseminating resources for different actors in Sweden's highly decentralized governance system and building their P/CVE capacities. A notable example is the Support Model for Handling and Investigating Concerns for Violent Extremism, which provides [guidance](#) and [resources](#) for city-level and other professionals who are concerned about an individual's potential radicalization into violent extremism and are positioned to intervene. In addition to specific guidance for performing interventions, it also provides critical information to increase knowledge and understanding of violent extremism among the police, social workers, teachers and other frontline actors.

⁸ For example, Hertfordshire county assembled the [Hertfordshire Safeguarding Children Partnership \(HSCP\)](#), which coordinates a multisectoral approach and “ensures that all agencies and organisations who work with children and young people work together to keep them safe.”

⁹ Examples include the [Education & Training Foundation](#) and [National Youth Agency](#).

¹⁰ Examples include [The Safeguarding Company](#) and [High Speed Training](#).



“Build the organizational capacity of civil society and other local P/CVE conducive to terrorism actors in relation to project management, financial administration, and M&E.” Good Practice 13

Learning-by-doing is a critical part of training. It can help connect conceptual learning with practical application and offer participants a chance to critically explore concepts and test the limits of their comprehension. Therefore, implementors should be mindful of incorporating opportunities for participants to learn through application. P/CVE stakeholders should consider ways to package skills-based training with other resources in comprehensive capacity building programs. The Shared Endeavor Fund in **London**, UK is one such example. Launched by MOPAC, the [Shared Endeavor Fund](#) supports P/CVE efforts of grassroots’ organizations by providing small scale funding along with targeted capacity building to support and strengthen their capacity to deliver P/CVE programs at a community level. MOPAC partnered with the Strong Cities Network to provide this capacity building for its grantees, with a particular focus on M&E. This training helped them understand the Fund’s Theory of Change (TOC) along with its priority themes and taught them to develop their own TOC, design, deliver and analyze surveys and incorporate data and learnings into their project reporting. This training was provided over several workshops and grantees had access to ongoing mentoring. The inclusion of capacity building into a funding initiative enhanced the impact of the grantees’ projects in the short term as well as the participating organizations’ capacity to work more effectively in the long term, ultimately bolstering their potential as partners for NLC.

“Provide support, where appropriate, to local governments to evaluate the effectiveness of local P/CVE conducive to terrorism programs and policies, as well as M&E services to local actors involved in designing and implementing projects.”
Good Practice 13

3. International and other multilateral bodies should work with P/CVE stakeholders at all levels and across all sectors to fill gaps in capacities that are critical to effective and sustainable NLC.

Particularly since the elaboration of the UN Secretary-General PVE Plan of Action in 2015, international and other multilateral bodies have played a significant role in supporting P/CVE efforts globally. These include a range of UN bodies (e.g., UNOCT, UNDP, UNODC, UNESCO, UN Women, and IOM), regional bodies (e.g., the AU, ASEAN, IGAD, and OSCE), as well as the organizations like GCERF (the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund) and Hedayah. They are well-placed to leverage funds, expertise and resources to build the P/CVE capacities of government and non-governmental actors at the national and local level and across sectors.

As part of this work, a number of them have helped catalyze and support efforts to develop national and local P/CVE strategies and action plans and support local civil society-led initiatives. Although they have sought to promote inclusive and transparent approaches to the development of national frameworks, less attention has been given to ensuring inclusion and transparency applies as much to oversight of implementation as to development phases. Likewise, support for local initiatives from these agencies, though welcome, has been largely ad hoc and not sufficiently tied to relevant national frameworks.



There has been a plethora of P/CVE capacity building initiatives that have primarily targeted national government and/or civil society actors. However, the needs of some critical stakeholders, such as local governments, have largely been overlooked and limited attention has been given to ensuring the different national and local actors involved in P/CVE have the skills and tools required to work collaboratively – a prerequisite for meaningful NLC.

“International, regional and sub-regional organizations should provide training and mentoring to national and local government and civil society implementing P/CVE conducive to terrorism programs, including through the design and delivery of training and other capacity building support.” Good Practice 2

The **United Nations** has taken this approach as it supports efforts to identify and address gaps in P/CVE capacities around the world. UNDP, through its global [Prevention of Violent Extremism](#) program, has been at the forefront of this effort. It has provided technical and financial support to more than 40 countries to promote “whole of society” approaches to addressing violent extremism by building the capacity of local, national and regional P/CVE actors across sectors. It also provides an [online hub](#) featuring best practices, resources and research to support P/CVE.

In terms of regional organizations, spurred by the elaboration of the UN PVE Plan of Action and the increased attention given by the UN system (and international donors) to prevention, the **African Union** (AU), through its [Africa Centre on the Study and Research on Terrorism](#) (CAERT) has begun to focus more attention on P/CVE in its interactions with its members. The Centre is encouraging AU members to enhance the involvement of local authorities and local communities in their P/CVE efforts and has also recently increased its focus on P/CVE training for its members. For example, it delivers programs on the role of education in P/CVE, as well as a training course for national and local stakeholders at a sub-regional level, to promote prevention as an effective response to the rise of violent extremism. This course, which was offered in West Africa in July 2022, includes modules aimed at increasing participants' understanding of: a) the context-specific drivers of violent extremism and reasons why some individuals join such groups; b) how to shift from a security approach to a preventative, human security paradigm for addressing the threat; and c) the various actors needed to enable a “whole of society” approach.

In addition to providing direct support, many international organizations have developed comprehensive training resources, such as handbooks, toolkits and training guides that actors at all levels can draw from when designing their own capacity building programs for P/CVE. For example, created by UNDP Malaysia and the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCT) developed the [Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism \(P/CVE\) in Malaysia: Handbook for Civil Society Organizations \(CSOs\)](#) to support civil society capacity in **Malaysia**. These kinds of resources are important because they can be used at scale, either by the intended beneficiaries directly or incorporated into tailored training programs.



4. *Capacity building efforts should draw on international good practice and include the exchange of experiences and expertise among P/CVE actors at all levels and across all sectors.*

In 2017, UNDP worked with the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) in **Tanzania** to draft the country's National Prevention of Violent Extremism Strategy and Action Plan.¹¹ NCTC and UNDP committed to a development process that was inclusive and reflective of a “whole of society” approach to P/CVE. To reinforce this, the drafting process included several forms of capacity building to support critical functions in the drafting and delivery of the action plan, many of which drew upon good practice from the region. Early in the process, Tanzanian officials undertook a study visit to Kenya to learn about developing and implementing P/CVE strategies nationally and sub-nationally. Further training for NCTC staff on terrorism, violent extremism, radicalization to violence, and resilience drew on examples from other countries, including Kenya, Somalia and Nigeria to “acquaint trainees with comparison aspects of VE and radicalization to be able to prepare a Strategy based on the Tanzanian context.” The strategy's pillars were informed by a literature review of existing strategies from different countries and international guidelines that were ultimately validated through regional consultations. The process also included capacity building for police to improve community engagements for young people, women and marginalized group to improve trust and resilience to violent extremism. The drafting of Tanzania's National Prevention of Violent Extremism Strategy and Action Plan is an illustrative example of how capacity building can be incorporated to improve P/CVE processes and utilize international good practice to support NLC.

In Europe, the European Commission facilitates the sharing of good practice among **European Union** (EU) policy makers and P/CVE practitioners through the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN). RAN is a support mechanism to enhance P/CVE capacities through research, resources and training, as well as by regularly convening meetings between members of its two networks, [RAN Policy Support](#) and [RAN Practitioners](#). The RAN Practitioners network is organized into thematic working groups and connects a wide range of frontline practitioners¹² so they may “share their extensive knowledge, first-hand experiences and approaches with one another, and peer review each other's work.” The Policy Support network on the other hand is a multi-sectoral forum. While its primary beneficiaries are policy makers, it also convenes exchanges with representatives from the public and private sector, civil society, academia, think tanks and other researchers. Through RAN, the European Commission is building the capacity of P/CVE stakeholders across sectors and levels and highlighting good practice from around the continent. In addition to promoting approaches and skills that support NLC in P/CVE, RAN helps support **coordination** at a regional level to support member states to implement key EU policy priorities.

“International, regional and sub-regional organizations should facilitate sharing of expertise, experience, and lessons learned among practitioners from different countries, regions, international, regional, and sub-regional organizations, and, where appropriate, an inclusive conversation among national and local P/CVE conducive to terrorism stakeholders on the drivers of violent extremism conducive

¹¹ Information for this case study was provided directly to Strong Cities by UNDP.

¹² Including “civil society representatives, social workers, youth workers, teachers, healthcare professionals, Frontline practitioners include local authority representatives, police officers and prison officers” who are “engaged in both preventing and countering violent extremism in all its forms and rehabilitating and reintegrating violent extremists”.



to terrorism within the country, and on how government policies, plans, and programs can best address them.” Good Practice 2

Through its [Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Center of Excellence](#), the **Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)** has facilitated coordination among IGAD members and Tanzania on P/CVE issues, focusing particular attention on promoting a “whole of society” approach to the challenge. It spearheaded the development of a [Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism](#) and continues to work to ensure the framework’s elements are reflected in relevant national plans. The strategy offers guidance to national governments in the region and a structure within which national P/CVE actors can exchange ideas. It calls for national legislation on P/CVE but prioritises “the empowerment of non-state stakeholders including civil society organizations, the private sector, organizations of academics, and faith-based organizations”. Since its launch in 2017, the centre has focused on increasing the capacity of IGAD members in terms of research, strategic communications, community outreach, knowledge sharing and multiagency collaboration.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CAPACITY:

- Before planning capacity building initiatives, conduct a mapping to identify gaps and determine priority themes and stakeholders. Focus should be given to gaps that limit NLC, such as trust, communication and coordination.
- Capacity building should give sufficient focus to actors from national and local government, as well as relevant frontline workers, law enforcement and non-governmental actors. Each stakeholder should be considered individually to provide the training they need to play their particular role, and collectively to promote a cooperative approach in which each role reinforces the efforts of the others.
- In addition to training individuals, consider capacity building to enhance P/CVE systems (e.g., related to information sharing and coordination), especially those that support NLC.
- Where possible, adapt existing capacity building tools and models to meet P/CVE needs, rather than creating dedicated curricula from scratch. Be mindful, however, to adapt models, curricula, and materials to a given context and the needs of its P/CVE stakeholders and beneficiaries.
- Governments should consider opportunities to partner with civil society, private sector and multilateral organizations who specialize in P/CVE training to fill gaps.
- P/CVE actors can enhance the sustainability of capacity building efforts by investing in train-the-trainer models that are scalable and can be adapted to local and hyper local needs.
- Wherever possible, P/CVE training should be tailored by targeting it to address specific issues or scenarios that participants are likely to encounter, rather than employing a generalized training curriculum. This should include interactive learning tools such as tabletop exercises that test participants’ knowledge and skills and support them to apply them critically. Training should also be developed with different learning styles and potential disabilities in mind. P/CVE actors should prioritize accessibility when planning training curriculums and resources.
- Governments and civil society should consider developing multimedia resources, such as toolkits and training materials, that P/CVE actors can access easily and consistently to support specific competencies as needed. As much as possible, these resources should be short, employ simple language and be grounded in real-world application by including examples.



Chapter 6: Sustainability

Sustainability refers to the capability to maintain P/CVE policies, strategies and activities over the long term. This is critical because, as a practice, these efforts are often focused on addressing political, social, economic and cultural conditions that are deeply rooted in a region's, country's or community's complex history. These conditions are unlikely to be affected through a series of policies and programs that last only a few years. Furthermore, P/CVE as a field is relatively new and is still trying to establish "what works" to prevent individuals from being radicalized to violent extremism and the most effective approaches to get those who have already done so to disengage from violence. This requires the time, space and resources to innovate, pilot, and evaluate new approaches.

KEY CONSIDERATIONS:

To support NLC, P/CVE stakeholders should pursue sustainability in three core areas:

Political: will policies, programs, and structures be maintained following a change in political leadership or are they vulnerable to politicization, and at risk of being disrupted depending on which political party is in power?

Sustainability necessitates consistent frameworks, funding, structures and relationships that partners at different levels and sectors can depend upon, regardless of the person or party in charge. It should also build political buy-in from P/CVE stakeholders and the public. To enhance sustainability, governments should resist the temptation to politicize the appointment of P/CVE coordinators and commit to ensure that all P/CVE positions and bodies are treated as technical ones that are shielded from partisan politics. They should also regularly assess and demonstrate the impact of P/CVE programs to bolster political will and buy-in from beneficiaries.

"Take appropriate steps to allow P/CVE conducive to terrorism initiatives to transcend any particular administration to maximize the sustainability of such efforts, e.g., by identifying a lead agency or office within the local administration." Good Practice 5

Resource: will P/CVE stakeholders have consistent access to the funding and resources they need to operate? Governmental and non-governmental implementors – those who are delivering against P/CVE frameworks – need resourcing to plan and pursue medium to long-term objectives and achieve real impact. Without this, implementors are limited to short-term projects or risk having their delivery disrupted, which can undermine trust with beneficiaries. Funding schemes should pursue opportunities to invest in sustained change, rather than single activities and should be rooted in long-term commitments, either through multi-year grants or dedicated lines in national or local budgets. Moreover, P/CVE stakeholders should bear in mind the importance of flexibility and adaptability in response to changing circumstances, new threats, or emerging challenges related to violent extremism contextually.

Implementation: are frameworks, projects and activities working in a strategic way toward a long-term vision? P/CVE actors need to consider sustainability when designing and delivering P/CVE outputs to help ensure they are having a sustained impact on their beneficiaries that outlives specific engagements. To enhance sustainability, implementors should incorporate research to ensure activities are based in evidence and meet the needs of their beneficiaries; build upon existing



structures to integrate P/CVE into other relevant security and social programming; and employ M&E to understand their impact, enhance their effectiveness and identify replicable good practice.

RELEVANT GCTF GOOD PRACTICES:

- **Good Practice 5:** Invest in local actors, frameworks, and programs
- **Good Practice 10:** Encourage sustainable funding to support local implementation of national P/CVE conducive to terrorism frameworks.
- **Good Practice 11:** Provide or otherwise support tailored training and other capacity building
- **Good Practice 12:** Sustain political support.
- **Good Practice 13:** 13: Enable the effective and sustained monitoring and evaluation of national and local P/CVE conducive to terrorism initiatives.

1. *National governments should ensure consistent funding is available to support locally led P/CVE.*

Funding is a critical component of all P/CVE efforts, and its precarious and typically short-term nature is one of the greatest limitations to sustainability. While limited funding often restricts P/CVE efforts at the national level, this neglect is felt more acutely at the local level and can seriously impede NLC. Therefore, national governments should allocate dedicated resources to support locally led P/CVE. There are many ways that national governments can leverage dedicated funding to support local P/CVE, including:

Providing dedicated funding to support local P/CVE implementation. For example, **Switzerland's** five-year National Plan of Action to Combat Radicalisation and Violent Extremism includes a [National Incentive Programme](#) that allotted five million Swiss Francs to fund cantons, cities, communes and civil society organizations in developing and delivering P/CVE projects that would support the NAP. The programme also dedicated additional funds to deploy a national pool of experts in disengagement and reintegration that filled critical gaps in **capacity**.

A similar fund is available in **Canada** where the national government supports local P/CVE initiatives through its [Community Resilience Fund](#). Managed by the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre), the fund has provided more than 44.7 million CAD – often with grants lasting for five years – to support local government and non-governmental organizations since 2017.

In Germany the Federal Programme "[Live Democracy!](#)" facilitates projects all over Germany which develop and trial new ideas and innovative approaches in promoting democracy, shaping diversity and preventing extremism. The federal programme supports among others towns and cities, municipalities and rural districts throughout Germany in developing "partnerships for Democracy" as structurally based local or regional alliances to promote democracy, shape diversity and prevent extremism. These partnerships bring together decision-makers from local politics and administration and people active in all aspects of civil society. The partnerships decide independently on the types of measures that are to be carried out in their respective local areas. Currently, the programme is funding more than 350 "partnerships for Democracy".

Investing in locally led capacity building programs that reinforce the capabilities of communities to engage in and support P/CVE efforts. For example, the **United States'** [Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention \(TVTP\) Grant Program](#) is providing funds to support local governments, non-profits, and academic institutions "to develop sustainable, multidisciplinary targeted violence and terrorism prevention capabilities in local communities, to pilot innovative prevention approaches, and to identify prevention best practices that can be replicated in communities across the country."



Collaborating with local governments to pilot new ways of working. For example, in **Germany**, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community (BMI) worked with six municipalities to pilot new community-based approaches for P/CVE as part of the “[Model Municipalities for Deradicalisation](#)” (MoDeRad) project. Throughout the project, the BMI allocated 67 thousand Euros of funding and met with the municipalities regularly, with support from an advisory council of P/CVE experts, to understand the challenges and opportunities facing municipal led P/CVE. Through this pilot project, the BMI sought “not to duplicate the work that is already done at state level but to add meaningful aspects at local level” and identified the opportunities to do so. The results of the project were documented in a public [report](#) that is available on the BMI’s website.

“Generally, the P/CVE conducive to terrorism field needs consistent funding, so that prevention efforts can address often long- term risk indicators, and so that research and practice can become more evidence based and effective.” Good Practice 10

In places where local governments do not have the resources to support local efforts adequately or consistently, international and other multilateral organizations have provided critical subsidization. This can present new challenges, however. International donors will often have their own priorities, which may not align with those of the national or local governments. It can also create a disconnect between local delivery and national frameworks that risks undermining trust and cooperation, ultimately hindering NLC. The [Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund](#) (GCERF) is an innovative approach to address this challenge, helping to ensure sustained funding for locally led prevention efforts while coordinating with governments.

GCERF is public-private, “global fund” that has made long-term investments of nearly \$100 million across 14 countries, pooling contributions from more than a dozen donors. During this time, it has prioritized finding ways to reach and build the capacity of small, grassroots organizations that would otherwise have difficulty accessing traditional sources of funding (e.g., bilateral donors) and has emphasized the need to align GCERF funding decisions with the priorities reflected in the relevant national P/CVE framework. In **Kenya**, for example, GCERF worked with the National Counter Terrorism Center and county-level governments to provide \$5.5 million to date to support CSOs and community projects that are in line with the national strategy and county action plans.

In countries where it has invested funds, GCERF has worked to set up inclusive country **coordination** mechanisms. These Country Support Mechanisms typically include representatives from national governments, civil society, and the private sector. A recent independent assessment of GCERF’s work found that the mechanisms “are successfully facilitating coordination among partner governments, donors, and the GCERF Secretariat, whilst aligning GCERF investments with national strategies; and facilitating government ownership over GCERF investments.” The assessment did find, however, that CSMs had generally been dominated by representatives from national governments and donors, with civil society and private sector involvement more difficult to secure.

2. All P/CVE actors should prioritize evaluation to understand and demonstrate what works.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) enables P/CVE stakeholders to understand what works and what doesn’t and to build effective, scalable frameworks and models that enhance the sustainability of implementation. It also helps bolster political sustainability by enabling stakeholders to demonstrate



impact and secure buy-in among partners, participants and beneficiaries. This can help bolster political will for government-led initiatives and ongoing support for civil society-led initiatives.

“[M&E] can bolster the argument for long-term investments in P/CVE conducive to terrorism by helping increase the effectiveness of future interventions.” Good Practice 13

National and local governments should incorporate M&E into all of their P/CVE work, including by integrating it into strategic frameworks. For example, **Nigeria** has [developed](#) a Monitoring & Evaluation Strategy to complement the Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAP). The M&E strategy helps enable local implementation by supporting P/CVE actors to plan, deliver and evaluate their activities and helps bolster NLC by aligning local efforts with the NAP and standardizing evaluation to help evaluate P/CVE on a national scale.

National and local government should also incorporate M&E into their P/CVE programs and support mechanisms to understand and demonstrate impact. MOPAC’s Shared Endeavor Fund in **London** is one such example. Currently in its fourth round, it has provided more than £3 million of funding for CSOs across London. This kind of funding is critical for the sustainability of locally led P/CVE, and to ensure they can sustain this kind of support, MOPAC commissioned an [external](#) evaluation of the Fund. An independent evaluator worked with each of the grantees to evaluate their project, utilizing a standardized method to assess their impact. The findings were published in a public report at the end of each round. These reports showcase the importance of supporting civil society and community-based P/CVE and have provided critical learnings both for improving the Fund each round and the field more broadly, as it covers a broad range of approaches and offers key takeaways for organising local funding schemes.

3. *National and local governments should pursue cooperative approaches that align P/CVE with other structures and bodies.*

In the **United States**, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is promoting the development of local frameworks to support P/CVE. In Massachusetts, DHS worked with the Trauma and Community Resilience Center at Boston Children’s Hospital to launch the [Massachusetts Area Prevention framework \(MAP\)](#). MAP is a community based, multidisciplinary approach to P/CVE that partners law enforcement with health and social services and education to help at-risk youth in the region. MAP works with communities to identify at-risk youth and then cooperates with the family to connect them with community-based services, according to the individual’s needs. The Trauma and Community Resilience Center is also pioneering [research](#) into “multidisciplinary team responses” to violent radicalization that includes an evaluation of the model, which is being done in collaboration between the Boston FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the U.S. Attorney’s Office with support from Massachusetts’s Departments of Public Health and Education and the Executive Office of the Trial Courts. They are also [training](#) mental health practitioners to enhance their **capacity** to support TVTP (i.e., P/CVE). This comprehensive package of programming is a good example of cooperation between national and local bodies, both in funding and development, to produce a sustainable model that leverages local services and expertise to provide community-level P/CVE at scale.



“Leverage local services, institutions, and professionals as part of a comprehensive approach to P/CVE conducive to terrorism, without undermining the principle that such services should be delivered based on need.” Good Practice

5

Rather than creating new bodies that coordinate with existing structures, it is also possible to expand the responsibilities of existing bodies to integrate P/CVE into other forms of crime and violence prevention. In the **Netherlands**, for example, 25 [Safety Houses](#) operate across the country, each responsible for a designated safety region. Safety houses coordinate emergency services in the event of a crisis and provide a place for local representatives, such as social welfare, housing agencies, law enforcement and youth workers to meet and address a broad range of public safety issues, including violence, public misconduct and when necessary, radicalization to violence. The safety houses are locally run and function by maintaining a trusting relationship with the population within their jurisdiction. However, they liaise frequently with national authorities, including law enforcement and intelligence services and receive guidance and financing from the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism whenever they are handling cases related to violent extremism. Safety houses were not originally intended or equipped to handle cases of violent extremism; however, in 2014, four cities asked for the safety house in their safety zone to receive cases dealing with individuals identified as being at an early stage of radicalisation to violence. Since then, this part of the public safety apparatus has been effectively incorporated into the country’s P/CVE strategy and now plays a critical role in NLC.

“Where possible, governments should leverage existing local resources dedicated to community safety rather having to allocate specialized funds.” Good Practice

10

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABILITY:

- Governments should shield P/CVE efforts from the instabilities of politics by emphasizing the technical nature of the positions and structures. When there is a change of personnel, governments should take care to ensure training, relationships and institutional knowledge are transferred to the person’s successor to avoid disruptions.
- National governments should pursue an integrated approach to P/CVE that incorporates efforts into existing structures across the national and local levels, coordinating with established bodies and funding mechanisms.
- All P/CVE stakeholders should monitor and evaluate their efforts to understand what works and adapt programing as needed. Results should be shared with other actors across levels and sectors wherever possible, to help disseminate good practice and lessons learned to help advance a coordinated approach and advance the field of P/CVE more broadly. Results should also be shared to help bolster support for approaches and actors and sustain buy-in. Networks and coordination bodies can help facilitate this, as part of their P/CVE mandate.
- International donors and other P/CVE funders should institute long-term funding opportunities, especially when supporting local efforts. Funding should be approached as not



only an investment in the impact of the single project, but in the development of locally held capacities, reinforcing the ability of community actors to work effectively and independently over the long-term, including on non-P/CVE related endeavors.

- International and multilateral organizations should work with national and local governments to bridge funding gaps and, where necessary, help develop and then sustain technical P/CVE structures and frameworks.



NLC Implementation Checklist

A ROADMAP FOR GOVERNMENTS TO ENHANCE P/CVE-RELATED NLC

To promote a “whole of society” approach to NLC in their country, governments should:

Establish a firm base of evidence to inform P/CVE efforts, including:

- Research and evidence-based approaches, including drawn from independent sources, to identify the primary threats from violent extremism, including key drivers of radicalization to violence, conducted on a national level and local level with input from community-based actors.
- Mapping and assessing the strengths and limitations of the existing P/CVE landscape, including which actors and sectors can support P/CVE efforts and what capacities need enhancing.
- Listening exercises with key communities across the country to incorporate a variety of perspectives.

Adopt a national framework for P/CVE that promotes a “whole of society approach” and is:

- Multisectoral and multiagency, recognizing the role of local government and different sectors, including civil society, private sector, law enforcement, and non-security agencies.
- Inclusive, incorporating a range of perspectives from relevant actors and diverse communities across the country.
- Accessible to P/CVE actors and those who can support national P/CVE objectives.

Produce new (or leverage existing) local frameworks that complement national P/CVE objectives and enable local ownership. This framework is:

- Multisectoral and multiagency, recognizing the role of community leaders, civil society organizations, the private sector, academia, frontline practitioners, and, where appropriate, law enforcement and non-security agencies.
- Inclusive, incorporating a range of perspectives from relevant actors in different communities, in particular those representing historically marginalized populations.
- Accessible to P/CVE actors and those who can support local P/CVE objectives.
- Coordinated so that each local framework complements and reinforces national objectives while pursuing a tailored approach that meets the unique needs of their communities.

Develop a comprehensive communications strategy for their P/CVE frameworks. This strategy could include:

- Awareness raising campaigns for P/CVE stakeholders across levels and sectors to ensure they understand national and local frameworks, as well as their role in supporting them.
- Strategic communication campaigns to introduce P/CVE efforts to the public and educate them about violent extremism, government-led P/CVE efforts and information about resources, funding opportunities and points for contacting national and local representatives; campaigns should be tailored for different communities, particularly those that include vulnerable populations.
- Plans and mechanisms for sharing information between national and local government, as well as between government and non-governmental actors that are reciprocal and respect both national security and personal privacy.



- A public website for storing and sharing P/CVE frameworks and related information and documentation.

Develop an M&E strategy for their P/CVE efforts. This strategy includes:

- A Theory of Change for national and local frameworks and programs.
- Regular reviews of national and local frameworks and associated programs, ideally performed by independent reviewers and shared publicly where appropriate.
- Resources available to local actors to support the evaluation of local programs.
- Coordination mechanisms to share good practices and lessons learned between P/CVE actors working at different levels and sectors across the country. They should also ensure results at all levels help inform national frameworks and use data and evidence from evaluations to inform policy decisions and improve program outcomes.

Establish coordination mechanisms that can facilitate cooperation and information sharing between the national and local level and between sectors. These should:

- Be integrated with other structures, such as crime or violence prevention or community safeguarding.
- Be led by an individual, office, or agency that is trusted across a range of national and local stakeholders.
- Be established as technical positions that are separated – as far as possible – from party politics, and thus more resilient to politicization or disruption during administrative change.

Provide training and resourcing for P/CVE actors across levels and sectors to ensure local stakeholders have the capacity to lead and support P/CVE efforts. This could include:

- Multi-year funding for local P/CVE efforts.
- Training for national government stakeholders as they develop P/CVE frameworks and programs to ensure they are inclusive, multi-sectoral, and grounded in a human-rights and “Do-No-Harm” approach.
- Training for local government stakeholders to enhance their understanding of P/CVE and build critical skills, including project management, communication and coordination.
- Tailored training for local service delivery agencies, as well as frontline workers and local police to ensure they can perform P/CVE related duties and build trusting relationships within their communities.

Engage internationally with multilateral organizations, as well as governments, experts and P/CVE actors in other countries. This could include:

- Meetings to exchange good practice and learn from successful approaches to “whole of society” P/CVE in other places.
- Accessing resources, guides and training curricula that can be adapted and tailored as needed.
- Accessing international funding and training programs to supplement support for local actors.
- Encouraging innovation and experimentation with new approaches and continuously assessing the evolving threat landscapes and adapt programs and approaches accordingly.



Glossary of Terms

Civil society: The arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, that is created by individual and collective actions, organizations, and institutions to advance shared interests.

Community: women, men, social groups and institutions that are based in the same area and/or have shared interests.

Countering violent extremism: proactive, non-coercive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that facilitate and enable violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence.

Foreign (terrorist) fighters: defined by UN Security Council Resolution 2178 as those “who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training.”

Local: The GCTF’s NLC Memorandum uses local to include provincial, regional, state, and municipal authorities and civil society organizations.

National-local cooperation: The GCTF’s NLC Memorandum denotes that national-local cooperation includes cooperation among relevant actors within a particular country. These can vary depending on the country and can include national government, local government, law enforcement professionals, mental health and education practitioners and other relevant civil society organizations, the private sector, and researchers.

Rehabilitation and reintegration: Rehabilitation is the process of assisting individuals to change and reduce problematic behaviors associated with illegal activity. Reintegration can be defined as an intervention aimed to support individuals recruited by terrorists and violent extremist groups to successfully integrate into community economically, socially, and psychologically.

Resilience: A multilevel, multisystemic process demonstrating the capacity to adapt successfully to challenges that threaten system function and viability or the development of systems.

Whole of society approach: an approach to preventing and countering violent extremism advocated by policymakers and practitioners that envisions a role for multiple sectors and civil society actors in prevention, intervention, and deradicalization/disengagement rehabilitation programs.



Annex I: Resources

SUPPORTING MULTI-ACTOR “WHOLE OF SOCIETY” APPROACHES TO P/CVE

[Developing Multi-Actor P/CVE Intervention Programmes: Implementing a “Whole of Society”, 'Do No Harm' Approach](#)

Author: IJJ

Type: Training Curriculum

A first-of-its-kind training curriculum to promote the design and implementation of multi-actor intervention programs for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The curriculum takes into account relevant local context and needs and advances a “Do No Harm” approach in this important area and draws on recommendations and guidance developed by the UN, GCTF and OSCE.

[Developing National and Regional Action Plans to Prevent Violent Extremism](#)

Author: UNOCT

Type: Reference Guide

Practical and comprehensive guidance on how to adapt the [UN PVE Plan of Action](#) to specific national and local contexts.

[Developing and implementing Local Action Plans for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in East Africa](#)

Author: Strong Cities Network

Type: Toolkit

A resource for national and local governments and civil society organisations in East Africa who are interested in developing a Local Action Plan (LAP) that leverages a multisectoral approach to strengthening community resilience and addressing the root causes of violent extremism.

[Multi-Agency Working and Preventing Violent Extremism](#)

Author: RAN

Type: Paper

This paper presents models of multi-agency working and the challenges of responding to the many and varied forms of violent extremism in EU countries. It includes a series of case studies from across the EU and identifies key considerations for those intending to introduce multi-agency working in P/CVE.

[Gender and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Policy Toolkit](#)

Author: GCTF

Type: Toolkit

A toolkit to support policy makers to integrate a gender perspective into approaches to prevent and counter violent extremism conducive to terrorism. It provides guidance and advice to support practical use of the [Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism](#).



[Online Community Engagement for PVE](#)

Author: UNDP

Type: Resource Hub

A series of resources to help P/CVE stakeholders enhance their community engagement efforts online. It includes a diagnostic tool to help users understand their needs and training and resources covering online approaches to mediation, peacebuilding, tolerance and inclusion, media literacy and community dialogue.

[Preventing Violent Extremism Through Sport](#)

Author: UNODC

Type: Technical Guide

The present guide was developed by UNODC as a tool to support governments and practitioners in their efforts to prevent violent extremism using sport as a vehicle to strengthen youth resilience to crime and violence. It is designed for policy makers and implementing organizations, as well as sports coaches, associations and clubs, as well as community organizations that work with youth in sport and community settings.

[Secondary Education: Terrorism and Violent Extremism](#)

Author: UNODC

Type: Technical Guide

A resource for teachers to critically engage secondary-level students (aged 13 to 18) in understanding the meaning and impact of terrorism and violent extremism, and other acts linked to terrorism and violent extremism.

[Handbook on Children Recruited and Exploited by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups: The Role of the Justice System](#)

Author: UNODC

Type: Handbook

A handbook developed to provide coherent and consistent guidance to national authorities on the treatment of children recruited and exploited by terrorist and violent extremist groups, with emphasis on the role of the justice system.

[Swedish Support Model for Handling and Investigating Concerns for Violent Extremism](#)

Author: The Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism

Type: Guide

A support model to help professionals who are concerned about an individual's radicalization into violent extremism. The aim is to offer quality support that professionals can use when handling and investigating concerns about violent extremism. It is also intended to increase the knowledge of the social services, the police, schools and other stakeholders about factors that can affect an individual's radicalisation process.



THEORETICAL AND SKILL-BASED TRAINING FOR P/CVE ACTORS TO SUPPORT NLC

[Countering Violent Extremism: An Introductory Guide to Concepts, Programming & Best Practices](#)

Author: Search for Common Ground and Hedayah

Type: Training Curriculum

An online training curriculum designed to provide training for government and civil society workers on the field of countering violent extremism. It is structured into ten learning modules and is accompanied by training materials, including a facilitator's guide, slide presentations, handouts, and pre-recorded webinars to allow for multi-day trainings. It is appropriate for all levels of experience and available in English, Arabic, and Russian.

[Monitoring National Action Plans on Preventing Violent Extremism](#)

Author: UNDP

Type: Briefing Paper

It provides practical guidance to practitioners for monitoring National Action Plans on PVE to help ensure that the monitoring process and tools developed are aligned with emerging good practice and incorporate lessons learned from different contexts. This briefing paper builds on UNDP and International Alert's toolkit, [Improving the impact of preventing violent extremism programming: A toolkit for design, monitoring and evaluation](#). Improving the impact of preventing violent extremism programming: A toolkit for design, monitoring and evaluation.

[Improving the impact of preventing violent extremism programming: A toolkit for design, monitoring and evaluation](#)

Author: International Alert

Type: Toolkit

This toolkit provides guidance to development practitioners and specialists to improve the design, monitoring and evaluation of programmes that focus on preventing violent extremism (PVE). It is designed as a living document for UNDP practitioners and partners who are working on programmes that are either specifically focused on PVE or have PVE-relevant elements to them. It draws on best practice for design, monitoring and evaluation in complex, conflict contexts adapting these for PVE programming.

[UNOCT Evaluation Handbook](#)

Author: UNOCT

Type: Handbook

A collection of examples, templates, checklists and other resources to support the evaluation of P/CVE activities.

[Risk Management for Preventing Violent Extremism \(PVE\) Programmes: Guidance Note for Practitioners](#)

Author: UNDP

Type: Briefing Paper

A quick reference guide for practitioners to develop a risk management strategy that can identify and manage PVE risks in a comprehensive manner.



Crisis Communication Toolkit

Author: UNOCT

Type: Toolkit

A toolkit designed to strengthen the capacity of governments and civil society to develop strong crisis communication which can help them to prepare, respond and recover from crises brought about by terrorist incidents. It includes theoretical crisis communication approaches, evidence-based principles, frameworks, best practices, templates and tools that can be easily adapted and quick to activate.

Trust-Based, Qualitative Field Methods A Manual for Researchers of Violent Extremism

Author: IGAD Center of Excellence for P/CVE

Type: Toolkit

A practical guide to conducting high-quality, trust-based, qualitative field research on violent extremism. The approach is adaptable for research in development and conflict affected contexts, as well as research that features youth. The guide is designed for experienced researchers in the IGAD region to enhance their work with new approaches.



Annex II: Case Studies Index

Page #	Location	Practice
Trust		
13	The Republic of North Macedonia	Community Action Teams
13	Kenya	Community Teams
13	Serbia	Local Safety Councils
13	Lebanon	Local Prevention Network
13	Jordan	Local Prevention Network
14	Uzbekistan	Mahallas
14	Toronto, Canada	Furthering Our Communities Uniting Services (FOCUS)
15	Finland	National Action Plan
15	Switzerland	National Action Plan
16	New Zealand	Royal Commission of Inquiry
16	New Zealand	He Whenua Taurikura
17	Mozambique	Immediate Stabilization in Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique
17	Boston, Massachusetts, USA	Youth and Police Initiative Plus (YPIP)
17	Indonesia	Inter-Religious Harmony Forums (FKUB)
18	Budvar, Hungary	Town halls
18	Ajloun, Jordan	Town halls
Inclusivity		
22	London, UK	A Shared Endeavour Report
22	Ninewa Governorate, Iraq	Plan of Action
23	Pakistan	National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines
23	Togo	National Prevention of Violent Extremism Strategy
24	Austria	Federal Network for Prevention of Extremism and De-radicalization (BNED)
24	Kyrgyzstan	Community Advisory Groups
Coordination		
26	Australia	Countering Violent Extremism Sub-Committee (CVESC)
27	Albania	Coordination Center for Countering Violent Extremism



27	Finland	National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism (NCN)
28	Indonesia	National Unity and Politics Offices (Kesbangpol)
28	Kenya	County Engagement Forums (CEFs)
29	Kosovo	Division for Prevention and Reintegration of Radicalized Persons (DPRRP)
29	Germany	Model Municipalities for Deradicalization (ModeRad)
29	New York City USA	Office for the Prevention of Hate Crimes (OPHC)
Communication		
33	Ghana	National Centre for Coordination of Early Warning and Response Mechanism (NCCRM)
33	Denmark	Info Houses
34	Indonesia	Early Warning and Early Response System Preventing Violent Extremism
34	Republic of North Macedonia	Awareness raising campaign
35	Tajikistan	Media engagement strategy
35	Philippines	Strategic communications campaigns
35	US	Prevention Resource Finder
36	US	Community Awareness Briefings
Capacity		
38	Morocco	Municipal training
38	International	IJJ's "Developing Multi-Actor P/CVE Intervention Programmes" training curriculum
39	Bosnia and Herzegovina	PRIDE training for social workers
39	Canada	Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPN-PREV)
40	US	McCain Institute's "Prevention Practitioners' Network" (PPN)
40	UK	Prevent teacher training
40	Sweden	Support Model for Handling and Investigating Concerns for Violent Extremism
41	London UK	Shared Endeavor Fund
42	International	UNDP Prevention of Violent Extremism program
42	African Union	Africa Centre on the Study and Research on Terrorism (CAERT)



42	Malaysia	SEARCCT's Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Malaysia: Handbook for Civil Society Organizations
43	Tanzania	Capacity building for the NAP
43	European Union	Radicalisation Awareness Network
44	East Africa	IGAD's Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Center of Excellence
Sustainability		
46	Switzerland	National Incentive Programme
46	Canada	Community Resilience Fund
46	US	Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program
47	Germany	Model Municipalities for Deradicalisation (MoDeRad)
47	Global	Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF)
48	Nigeria	M&E Strategy
48	London, UK	Shared Endeavour Fund
48	Massachusetts, US	Massachusetts Area Prevention framework (MAP)
49	Netherlands	Safety Houses

September 2023



GCTF

GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
FORUM

www.thegctf.org